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Abstract
The Colonel Blotto game, first introduced by Borel in 1921, is a well-studied game theory classic.
Two colonels each have a pool of troops that they divide simultaneously among a set of battlefields. The
winner of each battlefield is the colonel who puts more troops in it and the overall utility of each colonel
is the sum of weights of the battlefields that s/he wins. Over the past century, the Colonel Blotto game
has found applications in many different forms of competition from advertisements to politics to sports.
Two main objectives have been proposed for this game in the literature: (i) maximizing the guaran-
teed expected payoff, and (ii) maximizing the probability of obtaining a minimum payoff u. The former
corresponds to the conventional utility maximization and the latter concerns scenarios such as elections
where the candidates’ goal is to maximize the probability of getting at least half of the votes (rather than
the expected number of votes). In this paper, we consider both of these objectives and show how it is
possible to obtain (almost) optimal solutions that have few strategies in their support.
One of the main technical challenges in obtaining bounded support strategies for the Colonel Blotto
game is that the solution space becomes non-convex. This prevents us from using convex programming
techniques in finding optimal strategies which are essentially the main tools that are used in the literature.
However, we show through a set of structural results that the solution space can, interestingly, be parti-
tioned into polynomially many disjoint convex polytopes that can be considered independently. Coupled
with a number of other combinatorial observations, this leads to polynomial time approximation schemes
for both of the aforementioned objectives.
We also provide the first complexity result for finding the maximin of Blotto-like games: we show that
computing the maximin of a generalization of the Colonel Blotto game that we call General Colonel
Blotto is exponential time-complete.
∗A portion of this work was completed while some of the authors were visiting Simons Institute for Theory of Computing.
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1 Introduction
The Colonel Blotto game, originally introduced by Borel in 1921 [5, 6, 10, 11], is among the first mathemat-
ically formulated strategic situations and has become one of the game theory classics over the past century.
In this game, two players — which we refer to as player 1 and player 2 — are fighting over a set of battle-
fields. Each player has a number of troops to distribute across the battlefields and the winner of each of the
battlefields is the player who puts more troops in it. The overall utility of each player is the sum of weights
of the battlefields that s/he wins. Although originally introduced to consider a war situation (as the terminol-
ogy implies,) the Colonel Blotto game has found applications in many different forms of competition from
advertisements to politics to sports [7, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22].
The goal in the Colonel Blotto game is to find optimal (i.e., maximin) strategies of the players. A mixed
strategy is maximin if it maximizes the guaranteed expected utility against any strategy of the opponent. For
certain applications of the Colonel Blotto game— such as the United States presidential elections, which we
elaborate on in the next paragraph — maximizing the expected utility is not desirable. In such scenarios, we
need to maximize the probability of obtaining a minimum utility u. This has been captured by the concept of
(u, p)-maximin strategies in the literature [3]. A strategy is (u, p)-maximin if it guarantees receiving a utility
of at least u with probability at least p. In this paper we consider both of these objective functions.
Perhaps the most notable application of the Colonel Blotto game is in the U.S. presidential election race.
Every state has a number of electoral votes and the winning candidate is the one who receives the majority of
these votes. In most1 of the states, awinner-take-all rule determines the electoral votes. That is, the candidate
who gets the popular vote in a state receives all the electoral votes of that state. Thus, the candidates have to
strategically decide on how they spend their resources such as funds, staff, etc., in different states. This can be
modeled by a Colonel Blotto instance in which each battlefield corresponds to a state and the colonels’ troops
correspond to the candidates’ resources. Here, maximizing the expected utility (i.e., the expected number of
electoral votes) does not necessarily maximize the likelihood of winning the race. Instead, the actual goal is
to maximize the probability of obtaining more than half (i.e., at least 270) of the electoral votes. As such, we
need to find a (270, p)-maximin strategy with maximum possible p.
Maximin strategies, or equivalently Nash equilibrium for constant-sum games such as Colonel Blotto,
are often criticized for that they may be too complicated (see e.g., [20, 26, 28]). That is, even if we are able
to find such solution in polynomial time, we may not be able to deploy it since the equilibria can have a
large support2. In the case of the Blotto game, the potential size of the support is enormous, while every
possible pure strategy in the support requires a prior (often costly) setup. Therefore it is tempting to find
a near-optimal strategy that uses very few pure strategies, and is near optimum against the opponent’s best
response — the main goal of the present paper.
However, limiting the support size ofter renders the game intractable. For instance, the decision problem
of existence of a Nash equilibrium when the support size is bounded by a given number is NP-hard even
in two-player zero-sum games [12], while this problem is unlikely to be fixed parameter tractable when the
problem is parametrized by the support size [9]. These results imply that in order to find optimal strategies
with bounded support, we need to use structural properties of the game at hand, even when the players have
polynomially many strategies. It becomes even more challenging for succinct games such as Colonel Blotto
wherein the strategy space itself is exponentially large.
Recent studies have made significant progress in understanding the optimal response problem in Colonel
Blotto when the support size is unbounded [2, 3, 4, 13, 14, 15, 24, 25, 27]. Note that the unbounded case is
also challenging to solve due to the exponential number of pure strategies of the players in the Colonel Blotto
game. In spite of that, for maximizing the expected utility, one can obtain optimal strategies in polynomial
1All states except Maine and Nebraska.
2The support of a mixed strategy is the set of all pure strategies to which a non-zero probability is associated.
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time by algorithms of Ahmadinejad et al. [2] and Behnezhad et al. [4]. The case of (u, p)-maximin strategies
is generally harder to solve. However, Behnezhad et al. [3] show that it is possible to obtain a logarithmic
factor approximation in polynomial time.
All of the results mentioned above rely crucially on the fact that the support size is unbounded. The chal-
lenges in obtaining bounded support strategies turn out to be entirely different. On one hand, for the choice
of each pure strategy in the support we still have exponentially3 many possibilities. On the other hand, we
show that bounding the support size makes the solution space non-convex. The latter prevents us from using
convex programming techniques in finding optimal strategies — which are essentially the main tools that are
used in the literature for solving succinct games in polynomial time [2, 3, 4, 16]. However, we show through
a set of structural results that the solution space can, interestingly, be partitioned into polynomially many dis-
joint convex polytopes, allowing us to consider each of these sub-polytopes independently. Combined with
a number of other techniques that are highlighted in Section 3, this leads to polynomial time approximation
schemes (PTASs) for both the expectation case and the case of (u, p)-maximin strategies.
We also provide the first complexity result for finding the maximin of Blotto-like games: we show that
computing the maximin of a generalization of the Colonel Blotto game that we call General Colonel
Blotto— roughly, the utility is a general function of the two allocations — is exponential time-complete.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, for any integer n, we use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. We denote the vectors by
bold fonts and for every vector v, use vi to denote its ith entry.
The Colonel Blotto game. The Colonel Blotto game is played between two players which we refer to as
player 1 and player 2. Any instance of the game can be represented by a tuple B(n,m,w) where n and m
respectively denote the number of troops of player 1 and player 2, andw = (w1, . . . , wk) is a vector of length
k of positive integers denoting the weight of k battlefields on which the game is being played.
A pure strategy of each of the players is a partitioning of his troops over the battlefields. That is, any
pure strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2) can be represented by a vector x = (x1, . . . , xk) of length k of
non-negative numbers where
∑
i∈[k] xi ≤ n (resp.
∑
i∈[k] xi ≤ m). In the discrete variant of the game, the
number of troops that are assigned to each of the battlefields must be non-negative integers. In contrast, in
the continuous variant, any assignment with non-negative real values is considered valid. Throughout the
paper, we denote respectively by S1 and S2 the set of all valid pure strategies of player 1 and player 2.
Let x and y be the pure strategies that are played respectively by player 1 and player 2. Player 1 wins
battlefield i if xi > yi and loses it otherwise. The winner of battlefield i gets a partial utility of wi on that
battlefield, and the overall utility of each player is the sum of his partial utilities on all the battlefields. More
precisely, the utilities of players 1 and 2, which we respectively denote by u1(x,y) and u2(x,y), are as
follows:
u1(x,y) =
∑
i∈[k]:xi>yi
wi, u2(x,y) =
∑
i∈[k]:xi≤yi
wi.
Note that in the definition above, we break the ties in favor of player 2, i.e., when both players put the same
number of troops on a battlefield, we assume the winner is player 2.
Also, we define the uniform Colonel Blotto game to be a special case of Colonel Blotto in which all of
the battlefields have the same weights, i.e., w1 = w2 = . . . = wk = 1.
The objective. The guaranteed expected utility of a (possibly mixed) strategy x of player 1 is u, if against
any (possibly mixed) strategy y of player 2, we have Ex′∼x,y′∼y[u1(x′,y′)] ≥ u. A strategy is maximin if it
3Or even an unbounded number of strategies for the continuous variant of Colonel Blottowhere the troops are capable of fractional
partitioning.
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maximizes this guaranteed expected utility.
In this paper, we are interested in bounded support strategies. The support of a mixed strategy is the set
of pure strategies to which it assigns a non-zero probability. We call a strategy c-strategy if its support has
size at most c. A maximin c-strategy is a c-strategy that has the highest guaranteed expected utility among
all c-strategies. Observe that we do not restrict the adversary to play a c-strategy here. In fact, given the
mixed strategy of a player, it is well-known that the best response of the opponent can be assumed to be a
pure strategy w.l.o.g. This means that an opponent that can respond by only one pure strategy is as powerful
as an opponent that can play mixed strategies as far as maximin strategies are concerned.
Another standard objective for many natural applications of the Colonel Blotto game is to maximize
the probability of obtaining a utility of at least u. This has been captured in the literature by the notion of
(u, p)-maximin strategies.
Definition 2.1. For any two-player game, a (possibly mixed) strategy x of player 1 is called a (u, p)-maximin
strategy, if for any (possibly mixed) strategy y of player 2,
Pr
x′∼x,y′∼y
[u(x′,y′) ≥ u] ≥ p.
In such scenarios, for a given minimum utility u, our goal is to compute (or approximate) a (u, p)-maximin
with maximum possible p. Similar to the expected case, we are interested in bounded support strategies.
That is, given u and c, our goal is to compute (or approximate) a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy with maximum
possible p. Again, we do not restrict the adversary’s strategy.
3 Our Results & Techniques
Throughout this paper, we discuss the optimal strategies of the Colonel Blotto game when the support size
is small. That is, when player 1 can only randomize over at most c pure strategies and wishes to maximize
his utility. Our main interest is in finding (almost) optimal (u, p)-maximin strategies as discussed above.
Nonetheless, we show in Section 7 that our results carry over to the conventional definition of the maximin
strategies and can be used when the goal is to maximize the expected utility.
When randomization is not allowed, any (u, p)-maximin 1-strategy with p > 0 is also (u, 1)-maximin.
Thus, the problem boils down to finding a pure strategywith themaximumguaranteed payoff. However, when
randomization over two pure strategies is allowed, wemay play two pure strategies with different probabilities
q and 1 − q and thus the problem of finding a (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy with p 6= 1 does not necessarily
reduce to the case where the goal is to find a single pure strategy. As an example, when n = m = 2
and we have two battlefields with equal weights (w1 = w2 = 1), a (1, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy can be
obtained by selecting a battlefield at random and placing two troops on the selected battlefield. However,
in this example (or in any example with m = n), no 2-strategy is (1, p)-maximin for p > 1/2 since the
opponent can just select our higher-probability strategy and copy it, ensuring we get utility 0 with probability
at least 1/2. More generally, for c = 2, even if n ≤ m, a simple observation shows that the only interesting
cases are when p = 1 (which reduces to the c = 1 case) or when p = 1/2. The idea is that when p > 1/2
holds, existence of a (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy for an arbitrary u implies that of a (u, 1)-maximin 2-strategy.
Similarly, if a 2-strategy is (u, p)-maximin for some u and 0 < p < 1/2, one can modify the same strategy
to make it (u, 1/2)-maximin. Therefore, for c = 2, the problem is (computationally) challenging only when
a (u, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy is desired. Thus, for c = 2, the problem essentially reduces to finding two
pure strategies x,x′ such that no strategy of the opponent can prevent both x and x′ from getting a utility
of at least u. A similar, but more in-depth analysis gives us the same structure for c = 3. That is, in this
case, we may look for a (u, 1/3)-maximin or a (u, 2/3)-maximin 3-strategy. This implies that in an optimal
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solution, we look for three strategies x,x′,x′′ such that no strategy of the opponent prevents two of or all of
(depending on whether p = 1/3 or p = 2/3) x,x′ and x′′ from getting a utility of at least u.
It is surprising to see that this structure breaks when considering more than three pure strategies (c ≥ 4).
For instance, consider an instance of the Colonel Blotto game with 4 battlefields (k = 4) in which the players
have 4 and 6 troops, respectively (n = 4, m = 6). Let the weights of the first 3 battlefields be 5 and the
weight of the last battlefield be 10. In this example, the goal of player 1 is to obtain a utility of at least 10
with the highest probability. One can verify with an exhaustive search that if player 1 were to randomize
over 4 pure strategies with equal probability, he could guarantee a utility of at least 10 with probability no
more than 1/4.4 However, we present in Table 1, a (10, 2/5)-maximin 4-strategy for player 1 that plays 4 pure
strategies with non-uniform probabilities.
Battlefield 1
w1 = 5
Battlefield 2
w2 = 5
Battlefield 3
w3 = 5
Battlefield 4
w4 = 10
Strategy 1, played with probability 2⁄5. 0 0 0 4
Strategy 2, played with probability 1⁄5. 1 1 2 0
Strategy 3, played with probability 1⁄5. 1 2 1 0
Strategy 4, played with probability 1⁄5. 2 1 1 0
Table 1: A (10, 2/5)-maximin 4-strategy for player 1 on instance B(4, 6, (5, 5, 5, 10)).
In order to design an algorithm for finding (u, p)-maximin strategies that does not lose on p, it is essential
to understand how player 1 randomizes over his strategies in an optimal solution. We begin in Section 4 by
showing that when randomization is allowed only on a small number of pure strategies, the number of differ-
ent ways to distribute the probability over the pure strategies in an optimal solution is limited. That is, one can
list a number of probability distributions and be sure that at least one of such probability distributions leads
to an optimal solution. This structural property is general and applies to any game so long as (u, p)-maximin
strategies are concerned.
Theorem 4.2 (restated informally). When randomization is only allowed on a constant number of pure
strategies, the number of possible probability distributions for an optimal (u, p)-maximin strategies is
limited by a constant.
Theorem 4.2 is proven via a combinatorial analysis of the optimal solutions. On one hand, we leverage
the optimality of the solution to argue that p cannot be improved. On the other hand, we use the maximality
of p to derive relations between the probabilities that the pure strategies are played with. Finally, we use
these relations to narrow down the probabilities a to a small set.
Indeed, a consequence of Theorem 4.2 is that when we fix a utility u and wish to find a (u, p)-maximin
c-strategy with highest p, p can only take a constant number of values. This observation makes the problem
substantially easier as we can iterate over all possible probability profiles and solve the problem separately
for each profile. Thus, from now on, we assume that we fix a probability distribution over the pure strategies,
and the goal is to select c strategies to be played according to the fixed probabilities. We assume that (i) u
and p are given in the input, (ii) we are guaranteed that a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy exists, and (iii) the goal
is to compute/approximate such a strategy.
Continuous Colonel Blotto. For the continuous case, we can represent each pure strategy with a vector of
size k of real values indicating the number of troops that is placed on each battlefield. Thus, a c-strategy can
be represented by c vectors of length k (given that we have fixed the probability distribution over the pure
strategies). A simple observation (also pointed out by Behnezhad et al. [3]) is that when the goal is to find
4We have verified this claim with a computer program.
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a pure maximin strategy, the solution is essentially a convex set with respect to the representations. That
is, if x1 and x2 are both (u, p)-maximin, any strategy whose representation is a convex combination of the
representations of x1 and x2 is also (u, p)-maximin. The pure maximin problem coincides with our setting
when c = 1. However, it is surprising to see that for c > 2, the solution may not be convex, even though we
use the same approach to represent the strategies.
As an example, imagine we have two battlefields with equal weights (say 1) and n = m = 2. Indeed
a (1, 1/2)-maximin strategy can be obtained for player 1 by randomizing over (0, 2) and (2, 0) uniformly.
Similarly, randomizing over (2, 0) and (0, 2) (the order is changed) gives us the same guarantee. However, a
convex combination of the two strategies plays (1, 1) deterministically and loses both battlefields against the
strategy (1, 1) of player 2. The situation may be even worse as one can construct a delicate instance whose
solution set is the union of up to 2Ω(k) convex regions no two of which make a convex set when merged.
A key observation that enables us to compute/approximate the solution is the partial convexity of the
solution. That is, we show that although the solution set is not necessarily convex, one can identify regions
of the space where for each region, the solution is convex. To be more precise, denote by x1,x2, . . . ,xc
the representations of the strategies. In this representation, xij denotes the number of troops that i’th pure
strategy places on the j’th battlefield. This gives us a ck dimensional problem space [0, n]ck. Divide this
space by k
(
c
2
)
hyperplanes each formulated as xij = xi
′
j for some i, i′ ∈ [c] and j ∈ [k]. Partial convexity
implies that the solution space in each region is convex, and as a result, gives us an exponential time solution
for the problem in the continuous setting. Roughly speaking, since the solution is convex in each region, we
can iterate over all regions and solve the problem separately using a linear program for each region. However,
we have exponentially many regions and therefore the running time of this approach is exponentially large.
x1 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ x2, x3 ≤ x3
x1 ≤ x1, x2 ≥ x2, x3 ≥ x3
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
x1    x1
1 2=
x2    x2
1 2=
x3    x3
1 2=
Figure 1: An example of how the solution space is decomposed for the case when k = 3 and c = 2. The figure
on the left illustrates 3 hyperplanes x1j = x2j . These hyperplanes divide the solution space into 8 regions and
for all the points in each region, as illustrated in the figure on right, x1j and x2j for j ∈ [3] compare in the
same way.
The above algorithm can be modified to run in polynomial time in the uniform setting. The high-level
idea is that when the battlefields have equal weights, there is a strong symmetry between the solutions of the
regions. Based on this, we show that in the uniform setting, one only needs to search a polynomial number
of regions for a solution. This idea along with the partial convexity gives us a polynomial time solution for
the uniform setting.
Theorem 5.5 (restated informally – proven in Section 5.1 for c = 2 and extended in Section 5.2 to c > 2).
There exists a polynomial time solution for finding a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy for Colonel Blotto in the
continuous case when all the battlefields have the same weight.
Indeed, the uniform setting is a very special case since we are essentially indifferent to the battlefields.
When we incorporate the weights of the battlefields, we no longer expect the solutions to be symmetric with
respect to the battlefields. However, one may still observe a weak notion of symmetry between the regions.
Recall that we denote the weights of the battlefields with w1, w2, . . . , wk. Let us lose a factor of 1 +  in the
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utility and assume w.l.o.g. that each weight wi is equal to (1+ )j for some integer j ≥ 0. Assuming that the
maximum weight is polynomially bounded (we only make this assumption for the sake of simplicity and our
solution does not depend on this constraint), the number of different battlefield weights is logarithmically
small. Thus, we expect many battlefield to have equal weights which as a result makes the solution regions
more symmetric. However, this idea alone gives us a quasi-polynomial time algorithm for searching the
regions as we may have a logarithmic number of different battlefield weights. To reduce the running time
to polynomial, we need to further prune the regions of the solution to polynomially many. Indeed, we show
that it suffices to search over a polynomial number of regions if we allow an approximate solution. Via this
observation, we can design a polynomial time algorithm that approximates the solution within a factor 1 + .
This settles the problem for the continuous setting.
Theorem 5.12 (restated informally – proven in Section 5.1 for c = 2 and extended in Section 5.2 to c > 2).
(u, p)-maximin c-strategy strategies of the Colonel Blotto admit a PTAS in the continuous setting.
Discrete Colonel Blotto. For the discrete setting, we take a rather different approach. The main reason
is that in this setting, even if we are guaranteed that the solution is convex, we cannot use LP’s to com-
pute/approximate a solution. Behnezhad et al. [3] give a 2 approximation algorithm that finds a pure maximin
strategy for the discrete setting. Indeed, this solution can be used to get a 2 approximate solution for the case
of c = 1. We both extend their algorithm to work for c ≥ 2 and also devise a heavy-light decomposition to
improve the approximation factor to 1 + . Both our extension and decomposition techniques are novel.
Behnezhad et al. [3] introduce the notion of a weak adversary. Roughly speaking, they define a relaxed
best response for player 2 that does not maximize the utility of player 2, but instead, approximately maximizes
his utility. We call a player that plays a relaxed best response, a weak adversary. By proposing a greedy
algorithm for the weak adversary, Behnezhad et al. [3] show that the payoff of the weak adversary and the
actual adversary differ by the value of at most one battlefield. That is, if the weights of the battlefields are
bounded by wmax, then the difference between the utility of an adversary and that of a weak adversary is
always bounded by wmax. Next, they show that a dynamic program can find a pure strategy of player 1
that performs best against a relaxed adversary and turn this algorithm into a 2 approximate solution for the
problem, by considering two cases 2wmax ≥ u and 2wmax < u.
Indeed losing an additive error of wmax may hurt the approximation factor a lot when the desired utility
u is not much more than wmax. Thus, in order to improve the approximation factor, one needs to design
a separate algorithm for the heavy battlefields. To this end, we introduce our heavy-light decomposition.
We define a threshold τ ≈ u and call a battlefield i heavy if wi > τ and light otherwise. In addition
to this, we assume w.l.o.g. that wmax ≤ u since otherwise one can set a cap of u on the weights without
changing the solution. Therefore, the maximum weight and the minimum weight of heavy battlefields are
within a multiplicative factor of 1/. Next, by incurring an additional 1 +  multiplicative factor to the
approximation guarantee, we round down the weight of each battlefield to the nearest (1 + )i. We show that
this leaves us with a constant number of different weights for the heavy battlefields. Next, we state that since
the number of different weights for the heavy battlefields is constant, the total number of (reasonable) pure
strategies of player 1 over these battlefields can be reduced down to a polynomial. Indeed this also holds
for player 2, but for the sake of our solution, we should further bound the number of responses of player 2
over these battlefields. We show in fact, that the number of (reasonable) responses of player 2 over the heavy
battlefields against a strategy of player 1 is bounded by a constant! For light battlefields, we use the idea of
a weak adversary. However, in order to find a solution that considers both heavy and light battlefields, we
need to define multiple weak adversaries each with regard to a response of player 2 on the heavy battlefields.
Let us clarify the challenge of mixing the two solutions via an example. Suppose we have 4 battlefields
with weights 10, 8, 7 and 5 and the players’ troops are as follows: n = 5 andm = 2. One can verify that in
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this case, the following pure strategy of player 1 guarantees a payoff of 15 for him.
Battlefield 1
w1 = 10
Battlefield 2
w2 = 8
Battlefield 3
w3 = 7
Battlefield 4
w4 = 5
A (15, 1)-maximin 1-strategy for player 1. 2 2 1 0
Table 2: A (15, 1)-maximin 1-strategy for player 1 on instance B(5, 2, (10, 8, 7, 5)).
In fact, 15 is the highest utility player 1 can get with a single pure strategy as no other pure strategy of
player 1 can guarantee a payoff more than 15 for him. Now, assume that we select the first two battlefields
with weights 10 and 8 as heavy battlefields and the rest of the battlefields as the light ones. One may think
that by taking a maximin approach for the heavy battlefields and solving the problem separately for the light
battlefields, we can obtain a correct solution. The above example shows that this is not the case. We show
in what follows, that the maximin approach reports a payoff of 17 for player 1 which is more than the actual
solution. Fix the strategy of player 1 on the heavy battlefields to be placing 2 troops on battlefield 1 and 1
troop on battlefield 2. As such, the only reasonable responses of player 2 on these battlefields are as shown
in the following table.
Battlefield 1
w1 = 10
Battlefield 2
w2 = 8
troops left for player 2
response 1 2 0 0
response 2 0 1 1
response 3 0 0 2
Table 3: The responses of player 2 on the heavy battlefields.
Response 3 already gives player 1 a payoff of 18 which is more than 17. Also, response 1 of player 2 leaves
him with no troops for the light battlefields and thus he loses both light battlefields against strategy (1, 1) of
player 1 on the light battlefields. Therefore, this gives player 1 a payoff of 20. Also, if player 2 plays response
2 on the heavy battlefields, player 1 can win the light battlefield w3 by putting two troops on it. Indeed player
2 has only one troop left and there is no way for him to win this battlefield. Thus, in this case, the payoff
of player 1 would be 17. Since we take the maximum solution over all strategies of player 1 for the heavy
battlefields, our final utility would be at least 17.
What the above analysis shows is that, if we take a maximin approach on the heavy battlefields and then
solve (or approximate) the problem for the light battlefields, we may incorrectly report a higher payoff for
player 1. Roughly speaking, this error happens since in this approach, we allow player 1 to have different
actions over the light battlefields against different responses of player 2. To resolve this issue, we design a
dynamic program that takes into account all responses of player 2 simultaneously. Indeed, to make sure the
program can be solved in polynomial time, we need to narrow down the number of responses of player 2
to a constant. Our heavy-light decomposition along with our structural properties of the optimal strategies
enables us to reach this goal. This gives us a non-trivial dynamic program that can approximate the solution
within a factor 1 +  for the case of a single pure strategy.
Theorem 6.1 (restated informally). The problem of finding a (u, 1)-maximin strategy for player 1 in
discrete Colonel Blotto admits a PTAS.
To extend the result to the case of c ≥ 2, we need to design a weak adversary that plays a relaxed best
response against more than 1 strategy of player 1. For c = 1, the greedy algorithm follows from the well-
known greedy solution of knapsack. However, when c ≥ 2 the best-response problem does not necessarily
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reduce to knapsack and therefore our greedy solution is much more intricate. Roughly speaking, we design a
non-trivial procedure for player 2 that gets c thresholds as input, and based on these thresholds, decides about
the response for each battlefield locally. This local decision making is a key property that we later exploit in
our dynamic program to find an optimal strategy against a weak adversary. This in addition to the heavy-light
decomposition technique gives us a PTAS for (u, p)-maximin c-strategy strategies of Colonel Blotto in the
discrete setting.
Theorem 6.24 (restated informally). The problem of finding a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy for player 1 in
discrete Colonel Blotto admits a PTAS.
Further results. We show in Section 7, that our techniques also imply PTASs for the Colonel Blotto game
when instead of a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy we wish to find a maximin c-strategy. For the continuous
case, similar to the case of (u, p)-maximin strategies, we divide the solution space into polynomially many
convex subregions and prove that among them a (1 + )-approximate solution is guaranteed to exist. The
main difference with the case of (u, p)-maximin strategies is in the LP formulation of the problem, but
the general approach is essentially the same. For the discrete variant of Colonel Blotto, we also follow a
similar approach as in the case of (u, p)-maximin strategies. In more details, we partition the battlefields
into heavy and light subsets and define a weaker adversary that is adapted to approximately best respond
against maximin strategies. We find it surprising and possibly of independent interest that essentially the
same approach (though with minor changes) can be applied to these two variants of Colonel Blotto. Prior
algorithms proposed for these two variants were fundamentally different [2, 3, 4].
Theorems 7.8 and 7.12 (restated informally). The problem of finding a maximin c-strategy for player 1
in both discrete and continuous variants of Colonel Blotto admits a PTAS.
Finally, recall that motivation for approximate algorithms comes from intractability. In view of all the
recent sophisticated algorithmic approaches to solving, approximately, various special cases of the Colonel
Blotto game, it is worth asking, what is the computational complexity of the full fledged problem of comput-
ing a maximin strategy of the Colonel Blotto game? (Notice that, since the full strategy is too long to return,
we should formulate the problem in terms of something succinct, for example one component of the max-
imin.) In Section 8 we present the first complexity results in this area, establishing that an interesting variant
of the problem that we call General Colonel Blotto — roughly, the utility is a general function of the
two allocations, instead of the probability of winning more than a certain goal of total battlefield weight — is
complete for exponential time. The precise complexity of the two versions of the original game (computing
a maximin of the probability of winning a majority, or of the expectation of the total weights of battlefields
won) is left as an open question here. We conjecture that both problems are also exponential time-complete.
Theorems 8.1. General Colonel Blotto is exponential time-complete.
3.1 Paper Outline
In Section 4, we start by discussing possible probability distributions over the pure strategies in an optimal
(u, p)-maximin c-strategy. Then, focusing on (u, p)-maximin strategies, we show in Section 5 that the con-
tinuous Colonel Blotto game admits a PTAS. In Section 6, we show that the discrete variant of the game also
admits a PTAS. We further show how it is possible to adapt these results to the case of maximin strategies
in Section 7. Finally, in Section 8, we describe our complexity results.
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4 Probability Distribution Over the Support
In this section we discuss the structure of probabilities that are assigned to the pure strategies in the support
of an optimal (u, p)-maximin strategy. It is worth mentioning that our results in this section apply to any two
player game so long as the goal is to compute a (u, p)-maximin strategy.
Recall that given a minimum utility u, and a given upper bound c on the support size, our goal is to com-
pute a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy for maximum possible p; we call this an optimal (u, p)-maximin c-strategy
or simply an optimal strategy when it is clear from context. Naively, there are uncountably many ways to
assign probabilities to the c pure strategies in the support. However, in this section we show that there are a
small number of (efficiently constructible) possibilities for the probabilities among which an optimal solution
is guaranteed to exist.
Definition 4.1. For a mixed strategy x, define the profile ρ(x) of x to be the multiset of probabilities asso-
ciated to the pure strategies in the support of x.
The main theorem of this section is the following.
Theorem 4.2. For every constant c > 0, there exists an algorithm to construct a set Pc of O(1) profiles in
time O(1), such that existence of an optimal (u, p)-maximin c-strategy x with ρ(x) ∈ Pc is guaranteed.
As a corollary of Theorem 4.2, in order to find an optimal (u, p)-maximin c-strategy, one can iterate over
the profiles in Pc, optimize the strategy based on each profile, and report the best solution.
Let us start with the case when c = 1. Clearly, in this case, we have no choice but to play our pure
strategy with probability 1, therefore it suffices to have profile {1} in set P1, i.e., P1 = {{1}}. For the case
of c = 2, we play two pure strategies with probabilities q and q′ = 1 − q. Our claim for this case, is that it
suffices to have P2 = {{1}, {1/2, 1/2}}.5 Note that if the profile of a 2-strategy x is {1} it is also a 1-strategy
since it plays only 1 pure strategy with non-zero probability.
To prove that P2 = {{1}, {1/2, 1/2}} is sufficient, we first show that if a 2-strategy is (u, p)-maximin for
some p > 1/2, then there also exists a (u, 1)-maximin 1-strategy, thus, {1} ∈ P2 suffices.
Observation 4.3. If player 1 has a (u, p)-maximin 2-strategywith p > 1/2, then he also has a (u, 1)-maximin
1-strategy.
Proof. Let x and x′ be the two strategies in the support of a given (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy for some p > 1/2
and assume w.l.o.g., that strategy x is played with probability at least 1/2 (this should be true for at least one
of the strategies in the support of any 2-strategy). Since p > 1/2, by definition of a (u, p)-maximin strategy,
x should obtain a payoff of at least u against any strategy of player 2. This means that pure strategy x itself,
is a (u, 1)-maximin 1-strategy.
On the other hand, the following observation shows that for an optimal (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy, we
have p ≥ 1/2.
Observation 4.4. If player 1 has a (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy x for some 0 < p < 1/2, then by playing each
of the two pure strategies of x with probability 1/2, he gets a better (u, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy.
Proof. Let x1 and x2 be the two pure strategies in the support of x. Since p > 0, against any pure strategy
y of the opponent, at least one of x1 or x2 obtain a utility of at least u. Thus, if they are both played with
probability 1/2, the resulting strategy is (u, 1/2)-maximin.
5Note that the elements in Pc are multisets, hence multiple occurrences of the same element is allowed in them.
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Combining the two observations above, we can conclude that for an optimal (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy,
either p = 1 or p = 1/2. For the former case Observation 4.3 implies that {1} ∈ P2 is sufficient and for the
latter {1/2, 1/2} ∈ P2 is sufficient by Observation 4.4. We remark that it is necessary for any choice of P2 to
have both {1} and {1/2, 1/2}. Therefore our choice of P2 = {{1}, {1/2, 1/2}} is both sufficient and necessary.
We do not attempt to prove it here, as it is not required for the proof of our main theorem in this section,
however, it can also be shown that for the case of 3-strategies, it suffices to have
P3 = {{1}, {1/2, 1/2}, {1/3, 1/3, 1/3}}.
Unfortunately, the case of c ≥ 4 does not follow the same pattern. That is, e.g. when c = 4, it is not
sufficient to have P4 =
{{1}, {1/2, 1/2}, {1/3, 1/3, 1/3}, {1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4}}. An example was given for this in
Table 1 in the context of the Colonel Blotto game where the optimal 4-strategy has profile {2/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5}.
Nevertheless, we show that size of Pc, for any constant c, can be bounded by a constant.
Consider a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy x for player 1 in a two player game G and assume w.l.o.g. that the
strategies in its support are numbered from 1 to c. A subsetW ⊆ [c] is a u-winning-subset of x, if player 2
has a strategy y such that the ith strategy in the support of x gets a payoff of at least u against y if and only
if i ∈ W . We denote by Wu(x) the set of all u-winning-subsets of x. The following claim implies that it
suffices to have the set Wu(x) of any strategy x to decide how to assign probabilities to the strategies in its
support.
Lemma 4.5. Given the setWu(x) of a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy x, one can, in timeO(1), assign probabili-
ties ρ1, . . . , ρc to the pure strategies in the support ofx in a way that themodified strategyx′ is (u, p′)-maximin
for some p′ ≥ p.
Proof. LetW be the given set. Clearly we have |W| ≤ O(1) since it is a subset of the power set of [c] and
c is a constant. The following linear program finds ρ1, . . . , ρc in time O(1) since it has O(1) variables and
O(1) constraints. We show that by playing the ith pure strategy in the support of x with probability ρi, we
obtain a strategy x′ that is as good as x.
maximize p′
subject to ρi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [c]∑
ρi = 1
p′ ≤∑i∈W ρi ∀W ∈ W
(1)
Let us denote by qi the actual probability with which the ith strategy in the support ofx is played. Observe that
the probability p for which strategyx guarantees receiving a payoff of at leastu is exactlyminW∈Wu(x)
∑
i∈W qi.
This comes from the fact that by definition ifW is a u-winning-subset of x, then player 2 has a strategy y
against which player 1 receives a payoff of u by its ith pure strategy iff i ∈W . This means the probability of
guaranteeing a utility of u against y is equal to
∑
i∈W qi. On the other hand, by definition of (u, p)-maximin,
we need to guarantee a payoff of at least u with probability at least p against any strategy of the opponent.
Therefore we have p = minW∈Wu(x)
∑
i∈W qi. Now, observe that LP 1 finds probabilities ρi in a way that
precisely maximizes minW∈Wu(x)
∑
i∈W ρi. Therefore, if we play the ith pure strategy in the support of x
with probability ρi, we obtain a strategy that is as good as x.
Claim 4.6. One can obtain a set S of size O(1) in time O(1) such that for some optimal (u, p)-maximin
c-strategy x, we haveWu(x) ∈ S.
Proof. Let S be the power set of the power set of C = {1, . . . , c}. Note that |S| = 22c = O(1); thus, we
can simply construct S in time O(1). On the other hand, take an optimal (u, p)-maximin c-strategy x. By
definition each u-winning-subset of x is a subset of C and, thus,Wu(x) is a set of some subsets of C, thus,
Wu(x) ∈ S as desired.
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Indeed the two claims above are sufficient to prove Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.2 (restated). For every constant c > 0, there exists an algorithm to construct a set Pc of
O(1) profiles in time O(1), such that existence of an optimal (u, p)-maximin c-strategy x with ρ(x) ∈ Pc is
guaranteed.
Proof. Consider the set S provided by Claim 4.6. For every set W ∈ S, construct a profile ρ using the
algorithm of Lemma 4.5 and put it in a set P . Observe that |P | = |S| = O(1). Therefore it only remains to
prove that the profile of at least one optimal strategy is in P .
Note that by Claim 4.6, at least one setW ∈ S is the set of all u-winning-subsets of an optimal strategy.
By Lemma 4.5, the constructed profile forW is the profile of a strategy that is also optimal. Therefore among
the profiles in P , we have the profile of at least one optimal strategy which concludes the proof.
5 Continuous Colonel Blotto
In this section we consider the continuous variant of Colonel Blotto. We start with the case where our goal
is to find a (u, p)-maximin 1-strategy and show how we can generalize it to 2-strategies and, further, to any
bounded number of strategies.
For the particular case of c = 1, our goal is to find a single pure strategy that is (u, p)-maximin. Indeed,
since we are playing a single pure strategy with no randomization, the probability pmust be 1. One can think
of the solution of this case as a vector of non-negative real values that sum up to n and formulate the problem
in the following way.
find x
subject to xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [k]∑
xi ≤ n
u1(x,y) ≥ u ∀y ∈ S2
(2)
To analyze Program 2, we need to better understand the payoff constraints. To this end, we state another
interpretation of the payoff constraints in Observation 5.1.
Observation 5.1 (proven in [3]). A pure strategy x of player 1 guarantees a payoff of at least u against any
pure strategy of player 2 if and only if
∑
i∈S xi > m for any set S of battlefields with
∑
i/∈S wi < u.
Proof. (⇒): Suppose that a strategy x does not get a payoff of u against a strategy y of player 2. This means
that there exists a set S of battlefields that player x loses. The total payoff of x is below u, and therefore∑
i/∈S wi < u. In addition to this
∑
i∈S xi ≤ m holds since player 2 needs to match player 1’s troops in all
battlefields of S.
(⇐): It is trivial to show that if there exists such a violating set S, then x cannot promise a payoff of
u against any strategy of player 2. The reason is that since
∑
i∈S xi ≤ m player 2 can match the troops of
player 1 in set S and that suffices to prevent player 1 from winning a payoff of u.
Via Observation 5.1, we can turn Program 2 into LP 3 where we have a constraint for every possible
subset S of battlefields with
∑
i/∈S wi < u. Although the number of these subsets can be exponentially
large, Behnezhad et al. [3] show that one can find a violating constraint of LP 3 in polynomial time and thus
find a feasible solution using the ellipsoid method.
find x
subject to xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [k]∑
xi ≤ n∑
i∈S xi > m for every subset S of battlefields with
∑
i/∈S wi < u.
(3)
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The key idea that enables us to solve this variant is that we are playing only one pure strategy. Even the
case of having two pure strategies in the support is much more challenging. To illustrate the challenges and
ideas, we next focus on how to obtain a 2-strategy and later generalize it to c-strategies.
5.1 The Case of 2-Strategies
Recall by Observation 4.3 of Section 4 that if a 2-strategy is (u, p)-maximin for some p > 1/2, then there
also exists a pure (u, 1)-maximin strategy that, by aforementioned techniques, can be found in polynomial
time. It was further shown in Observation 4.4 that if a 2-strategy is (u, p)-maximin for some p < 1/2, we
can simply play the two strategies in its support with equal probability 1/2 to obtain a better (u, 1/2)-maximin
strategy. Combining these two observations, we can assume w.l.o.g., that in the case of c = 2, we wish to
find two pure strategies x and x′, and play them with equal probabilities such that any strategy of player 2
gives us a payoff of at least u for at least one of x or x′. A mathematical formulation of the problem is given
below.
find x and x′
subject to xi ≥ 0 and x′i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [k]∑
xi ≤ n∑
x′i ≤ n
either u1(x,y) ≥ u or u1(x′,y) ≥ u ∀y ∈ S2
(4)
Observe that the fourth constraint of the above program is not linear. In the following, we show that even
the polytope that is described by this program is essentially nonconvex.
Observation 5.2. Program 4 is not convex.
Proof. Suppose n = m = 2,w1 = w2 = 1 and the goal is to find a (1, 1/2)-maximin strategy by randomizing
over two pure strategies. A possible solution is to play x = (2, 0) with probability 1/2 and play x′ = (0, 2)
with probability 1/2 which guarantees a payoff of 1 with probability 1/2. An alternative way to achieve this
goal is to set x = (2, 0) and x′ = (0, 2) which is the same strategy except that x and x′ are exchanged.
However, the linear combination of the two strategies results in x = (1, 1) and x′ = (1, 1) which always
loses both battlefields against y = (1, 1). This is illustrated in Figure 2.
x = (0, 2) 
x = (2, 0) 
x = (1, 1) 
x = (1, 1) 
x = (2, 0) 
x = (0, 2) 
Figure 2: The linear combination of two feasible strategies in the example of Observation 5.2 is not feasible,
therefore, the feasibility region, which is represented by the hatched area is not convex.
A more careful analysis shows that the feasible region of Program 4 may be the union of up to 2k con-
vex polytopes which makes it particularly difficult to find a desired solution. In what follows, we present
algorithms to overcome this challenge for both the uniform and nonuniform settings.
5.1.1 Uniform Setting
Recall that in order to find a pure (u, 1)-maximin strategy, we proved the linearity of Program 2 by charac-
terizing the optimal solution. Similar to that, we show necessary and sufficient conditions for the solution of
Program 4. To this end, we define critical tuples as follows.
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Definition 5.3. Let L1, L2, and L12 be three disjoint subsets of battlefields. We call the tuple 〈L1, L2, L12〉
a critical tuple, if critical any of L1 ∪L12 or L2 ∪L12 suffices to prevent player 1 from getting a payoff of u.
In other words, 〈L1, L2, L12〉 is a critical tuple, if and only if∑
i/∈L1∪L12
wi < u, and,
∑
i/∈L2∪L12
wi < u.
Via this definition, we can now describe the feasible solutions of Program 4 as follows.
Observation 5.4. Two pure strategies x and x′ of player 1 meet the constraints of Program 4 if and only if
for any critical tuple 〈L1, L2, L12〉 we have∑
i∈L1
xi +
∑
i∈L2
x′i +
∑
i∈L12
max{xi, x′i} > m.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Observation 5.1. Note that x and x′ violate a payoff constraint of
Program 4 if they both get a payoff less than u against a pure strategy y of player 2. In this case we define
three sets L1, L2, and L12 as
L1 = {i : xi ≤ yi and x′i > yi}, L2 = {i : xi > yi and x′i ≤ yi}, L12 = {i : xi ≤ yi and x′i ≤ yi}.
Observe thatL1,L2, andL12 make a critical tuple since both x and x′ get a payoff less than u against y. Since
L1, L2, and L12 are disjoint and
∑
yi = m we have
∑
i∈L1 xi +
∑
i∈L2 x
′
i +
∑
i∈L12 max{xi, x′i} ≤ m.
A similar argument implies that if this condition does not hold for any critical tuple, then x and x′ meet the
conditions of Program 4.
Based on Observation 5.4 we rewrite Program 4 in the following way.
find x and x′
subject to xi ≥ 0 and x′i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [k]∑
xi ≤ n∑
x′i ≤ n
zi = max{xi, x′i} ∀i ∈ [k]∑
i∈L1 xi +
∑
i∈L2 x
′
i +
∑
i∈L12 zi > m for every critical tuple 〈L1, L2, L12〉
(5)
Indeed Program 5 is not convex since zi = max{xi, x′i} is not a linear constraint. The naive approach to get
around this issue is to consider 2k possibilities for the assignment of zi’s. More precisely, if we knew in an
optimal strategy for which i’s we have xi > x′i and for which xi ≤ x′i, we could turn Program 5 into a linear
program by replacing each zi with either xi or x′i. This observation gives us an exponential time solution to
find a (u, p)-maximin strategy by trying all 2k combinations. However, for the uniform case, we can further
improve the running time to a polynomial. The overall idea is that when we are indifferent between the
battlefields, we do not necessarily need to know for which subset of battlefields x puts more troops that x′.
It suffices to be given the count!
In the uniform setting, let xˆ and xˆ′ be the actual solution. Count the number of battlefields on which xˆ
puts more troops than xˆ′ and call this number α. Therefore, on k − α battlefields, x′ puts at least as many
troops as x. Since the battlefields are identical, we can rearrange the order of the battlefields to make sure
x puts more troops than x′ in the first α battlefields. If α is given to us, we can formulate the problem as
follows.
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find x and x′
subject to xi ≥ 0 and x′i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [k]∑
xi ≤ n∑
x′i ≤ n
xi ≥ x′i, zi = xi ∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ α
xi ≤ x′i, zi = x′i ∀i : α < i ≤ k∑
i∈L1 xi +
∑
i∈L2 x
′
i +
∑
i∈L12 zi > m for every critical tuple L1, L2, L12
(6)
Program 6 is clearly an LP. We show in Theorem 5.5 that LP 6 can indeed be solved in polynomial time.
This settles the problem when α is given. Note that α takes an integer value between 0 and k and thus we
can iterate over all possibilities and solve the problem in polytime.
Theorem 5.5. Given that an instance of continuous Colonel Blotto in the uniform setting admits a (u, 1/2)-maximin
2-strategy for player 1, there exists an algorithm to find one such solution in polynomial time.
Proof. As discussed earlier, the solution boils down to solving LP 6. Here we show that LP 6 can be solved
in polynomial time using the ellipsoid method. For that, we need a separating oracle that for any given
assignment to the variables decides in polynomial time whether any constraint is violated and if so, reports
one. LP 6 has polynomially many constraints, except the constraints of form∑
i∈L1
xi +
∑
i∈L2
x′i +
∑
i∈L12
zi > m for every critical tuple L1, L2, L12,
since there may be exponentially many critical tuples. Therefore the only challenge is whether any constraint
of this form is violated. That is for given strategies x and x′ and with zi = max{xi, x′i}, we need to design
an algorithm that finds a critical tuple 〈L1, L2, L12〉 (if any) for which we have∑
i∈L1
xi +
∑
i∈L2
x′i +
∑
i∈L12
max{xi, x′i} ≤ m. (7)
For this, note that as implied by Observation 5.4, it suffices to be able to find a pure strategy y of player 2
such that
u1(x,y) < u, and, u1(x′,y) < u. (8)
This is in some sense, equivalent to player 2’s best-response which we show can be solved in polynomial
time via a dynamic program. Define D(j,m′, υ, υ′) to be 1 if and only if player 2 can use up to m′ troops
in the first j battlefields in a way that prevents x (resp. x′) from obtaining a payoff of at least υ (resp. υ′) in
those battlefields. More precisely,D(j,m′, υ, υ′) is 1 if and only if there exists a strategy y for player 2 such
that
j∑
i=1
yi ≤ m′,
∑
i:i∈[j],xi>yi
wi ≤ υ, and,
∑
i:i∈[j],x′i>yi
wi ≤ υ′.
Clearly, if we are able to solve D(j,m′, υ, υ′) for all possible inputs, then it suffices to check the value of
D(k,m, u, u) to see whether we can find a strategy y satisfying (8). Indeed, we can update the dynamic
program in the following way:
D(j,m′, υ, υ′) = max
yj∈{0,...,m′}
D
(
j − 1,m′ − yj , υ − g(yj , j), υ′ − g′(yj , j)
)
,
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where,
g(yj , j) =
{
wj , if xj > yj ,
0 otherwise,
and, g′(yj , j) =
{
wj , if x′j > yj ,
0 otherwise.
As for the base case, we set D(0, 0, 0, 0) = 1. The correctness of the dynamic program is easy to confirm,
since we basically check all possibilities for the number of troops that the second player can put on the jth
battlefield and update the requirements on the previous battlefields accordingly. A minor issue, here, is that
this only confirms whether a strategy y exists that satisfies (8) or not and does not give the actual strategy.
However, one can simply obtain the actual strategy by slightly modifying the dynamic program to also store
the strategy itself.
To summarize, we gave a polynomial time separating oracle for LP 6 that gives a polynomial time algo-
rithm to solve it which leads to a (u, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy for player 1 in polynomial.
5.1.2 General Weights
Theorem 5.5 shows that the problem of computing a (u, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy is computationally tractable
when the weights are uniform. In this section, we study the general (i.e., non-uniform) setting and show that
it is possible to obtain an (almost) optimal solution for this problem in polynomial time.
Recall that we assume there exists a (u, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy and the goal is to either compute or
approximate such a strategy. Fix the pure strategies of the solution to be xˆ and xˆ′. Similar to Section 5.1.1,
if we knew for which i’s xˆi ≥ xˆ′i holds and for which i’s it is the opposite, we could model the problem
as a linear program and find a solution in polynomial time. Since wi’s are not necessarily the same, unlike
Section 5.1.1, we need to try an exponential number of combinations to make a correct decision. To alleviate
this problem, we show a generalized variant of the above argument. Define the status of battlefield i to be
compatible with either ≤ or ≥ (or both in case of equality) based on the comparison of xˆi and xˆ′i. Assume
we make a guess for the status of battlefields, which is incorrect for a set S of battlefields but correct for the
rest of them. This means that for every battlefield i in set S, if xˆi > xˆ′i, we assume xi ≤ x′i and vice versa.
We show that if the total weight of the battlefields in S is small, there exists an almost optimal solution for
the problem whose status is compatible with our guess.
For simplicity, we represent a guess for the status of the battlefields with a vector g ∈ {≤,≥}k of length
k in which every entry is either ‘≤’ or ‘≥’. A solution (x,x′) is compatible with this guess if gi correctly
compares xi to x′i.
Lemma 5.6. Let (xˆ, xˆ′) be an optimal (u, p)-maximin solution of the problem and g be a guess for the status
of the battlefields. Let S be the set of battlefields for which g makes an incorrect comparison between xˆ and
xˆ′ on these battlefields. If
∑
i∈S wi = α then there exists a (u − α, p)-maximin strategy that is compatible
with g.
Proof. We construct a pair of strategies (x,x′) based on xˆ and xˆ′. For every battlefield i ∈ S, we set
xi = x
′
i = 0 and for every battlefield i /∈ S we set xi = xˆi and x′i = xˆ′i. If a strategy of player 2 prevents
both x and x′ from getting a utility of u − α, then the same strategy prevents both xˆ and xˆ′ from getting
a payoff of u. Therefore, (x,x′) is (u − α, p)-maximin. Since for every battlefield outside set S we have
xi = x
′
i = 0, then both≤ and≥ correctly compare the corresponding values for such battlefields. Therefore,
(x,x′) is compatible with g.
A simple interpretation of Lemma 5.6 is that if we make a guess that differs from a correct guess in a
subset of battlefields with a total weight of α, we can use this guess to find a solution with an additive error
of at most α in the utility. Based on this idea, we present a polynomial time algorithm that for any arbitrarily
small constant  < 1 computes a ((1− )u, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy.
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δ-Uniform weights. One of the crucial steps of our algorithms, is updating battlefield weights. This step, is
indeed used in multiple other places of the paper as well. For a parameter δ, we define a δ-uniform variant
of the game to be an instance on which the weight of each of the battlefields is rounded down to be in set
W = {1, (1 + δ)1, (1 + δ)2, . . .}. That is, for any i ∈ [k], we set the updated weight of battlefield i to be
w′i = max{w : w ∈ W, w ≤ wi}. The following observation implies that we can safely assume the game is
played on the updated weights without losing a considerable payoff.
Observation 5.7. For any u′, any (u′, p)-maximin strategy of the game instance B(n,m,w′) with the up-
dated weights is a ((1 − δ)u′, p)-maximin strategy of the original instance B(n,m,w). Similarly, any
(u′, p)-maximin strategy of the original instanceB(n,m,w) is a ((1−δ)u′, p)-maximin for instanceB(n,m,w′).
Proof. Letx = (x1, . . . , xk) be any pure strategy in the support of the (u′, p)-maximin strategy ofB(n,m,w′).
Consider any arbitrary strategy y of player 2, it suffices to show that x gets a payoff of at least (1−δ)u′ against
y in the original instance B(n,m,w). Note that for any i ∈ [k] we have w′i ≥ wi/(1 + δ) ≥ (1 − δ)wi by
the way that we round down the weights; therefore, we have that∑
i:xi>yi
w′i ≥
∑
i:xi>yi
(1− δ)wi ≥ (1− δ)
∑
i:xi>yi
wi ≥ (1− δ)u′,
completing the proof for the first part.
Similarly, since theweight of each battlefield ismultiplied by a factor of atmost 1/(1 + δ), any (u′, p)-maximin
strategy for the original instance is a (u′/(1 + δ), p)-maximin or simply a ((1 − δ)u′, p)-maximin strategy
for instance B(n,m,w′).
The algorithm in a nutshell. We first update the weight of every battlefield i to be min{u,wi}. This, in
fact, does not change the game instance for player 1 since his only objective is to guarantee a payoff of at
least u. Now, for δ = 3/10 which is a relatively smaller error threshold than , we consider the δ-uniform
variant of the game. In the δ-uniform instance, since the weights change exponentially in 1 + δ, we have at
most O(1/δ · log u) distinct weights . We put the battlefields with the same weight into a bucket and denote
the sizes of the buckets by k1, k2, . . . , kb where b is the number of buckets. Recall from Section 5.1.1 that
if a set of battlefields have the same weight, then we are indifferent between these battlefields and thus the
only information relevant to these battlefields is on how many of them xˆ puts more troops than xˆ′. Therefore
one way to make a correct guess is to try all
∏
(ki + 1) possibilities for all of the buckets. Unfortunately,∏
(ki + 1) is not polynomial since the number of buckets is not constant. In order to reduce the number of
possibilities to a polynomial, we make a number of observations.
First, since the weights decrease exponentially between the buckets, the number of distinct weights that
are larger than δu/k (and smaller than u as described above,) is at most log1+δ k/δ = Oδ(log k). Observe
that we can safely ignore (i.e., make a wrong guess for) all the buckets with weight less than δu/k since
sum of the weights of all battlefields in such buckets is at most δu and by Lemma 5.6 it causes us to lose an
additive error of at most δu. Although this reduces the number of buckets down to Oδ(log k), it is still more
than we can afford to try all
∏
(ki + 1) possibilities.
Second, instead of trying kj + 1 possibilities for bucket j, we reduce it down to only O(1/δ) options.
More precisely, let tj be the number of battlefields i in bucket j such that xˆi ≥ xˆ′i. For any bucket j with
kj > 1/δ, if we only consider tj to be in set {0, bδkjc, b2δkjc, b3δkjc, . . . , kj} one of the realizations of
tj makes at most δkj + 1 incorrect guesses for bucket j. We use this later to argue that we do not lose a
significant payoff by considering only O(1/δ) possibilities per bucket. As a result, we reduce the size of the
cartesian product of all possibilities over all the buckets down to a polynomial.
Third, we show that if n ≥ (1 + )m/2, we can safely assume that losing the value of at most bδkjc
battlefields of buckets with more than 1/δ battlefields does not hurt the payoff significantly. In other words,
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when n ≥ (1 + )m/2, the optimal utility u is much larger than the total sum of the payoff we lose by only
trying 1/δ possibilities for every bucket j (proven in Lemma 5.8).
Based on the above ideas, we outline our PTAS as follows: (i) We first set a cap of u for the weight
of the battlefields. (ii) Let δ = 3/10. Next, we round down the weight of the battlefields to be powers
of (1 + δ). (iii) We put the battlefields with the same weights in the same bucket and remove the buckets
whose battlefield weights are smaller than δu/k. (iv) Finally, we tryO(1/δ) possibilities for the status of the
battlefields within each bucket and check its feasibility using LP 6.6 We return the first feasible solution that
we find. The formal algorithm is given as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to find a (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy for general weights.
Input: A payoff u for which existence of a (u, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy is guaranteed.
Output: Two pure strategies x and x′ that form a (u, 1/2)-maximin when played with equal prob. 1/2.
1: For every battlefield i, update wi to be min{u,wi}.
2: For δ = 3/10, we further update the battlefield weights and consider its δ-uniform variant.
3: Ignore every battlefield i with weight less than δu/k (i.e., naively guess xi ≥ x′i).
4: Put all battlefields of the same weight into the same bucket and denote by kj the number of battlefields
in bucket j.
5: For each bucket j with kj ≤ 1/δ, let Gj = {≤,≥}kj be the set of all possible guesses for it.
6: For each bucket j with kj > 1/δ, let Gj be the set of all guesses where for any d ∈
{0, bδkjc, b2δkjc, b3δkjc, . . . , kj} we have xi ≥ x′i for any i ≤ d and xi ≤ x′i for any i > d.
7: Let G = G1 × . . .×Gb be the cartesian product of the partial guesses of the buckets.
8: For any guess g ∈ G, construct an instance of LP 6 and return the first found feasible solution (x,x′).
Before we present a formal proof, we state an auxiliary lemma to show a lower bound on the value of u
when n ≥ (1 + )m/2.
Lemma 5.8. Let α be the total sum of the weights of the battlefields whose buckets have a size of at least
1/δ. If n > (1 + )m/2 then there exists a (α/8, 1/2)-maximin strategy for player 1 that randomizes over
two pure strategies.
Proof. Let B = {B1, . . . , Bb} be the set of all buckets with at least 1/δ battlefields. We slightly abuse
the notation and respectively denote by wi and ki the weight and the number of battlefields in Bi. This
means we have
∑b
i=1 kiwi = α. We construct a 2-strategy (x,x′) where both x and x′ are played with
equal probability 1/2 and claim that it is (α/8, 1/2)-maximin. To that end, for any bucket Bi ∈ B with
an odd number of battlefields, we ignore one battlefield (i.e., we put zero troops in it in both x and x′) to
consider only an even number of battlefields for each bucket. Denote by α′ the total weight of the remaining
battlefields, i.e., the battlefields in some Bi ∈ B that are not ignored. It is easy to confirm that
α′ ≥ (1− δ)α (9)
since from each of the buckets in B, at most one battlefield is ignored, which is only a δ fraction of the
battlefields in that bucket since all buckets in B are assumed to have at least 1/δ battlefields. Now, since only
an even number of battlefields remain in each bucketBi, we can partition them into two disjoint subsetsB
(1)
i
and B(2)i of equal size. Strategies x and x′ are then constructed as follows:
• In strategy x, for any i ∈ [b], we put exactly 2win/α′ troops in each battlefield in B(1)i . We put zero
troops in all other battlefields.
6As a minor technical detail, since our goal is to guarantee a payoff of at least (1 − )u instead of u, we need to update the
definition of losing tuples accordingly for this case.
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• In strategy x′, for any i ∈ [b], we put exactly 2win/α′ troops in each battlefield in B(2)i . We put zero
troops in all other battlefields.
Observe that the total number of troops that we use in each of the strategies x and x′ is exactly n as required.
To see this, in strategy x for instance, the number of troops that are used is
∑
i∈[b]
2win
α′
|B(1)i | =
2n
∑
i∈[b]wi|B(1)i |
α′
=
2n
∑
i∈[b]wi|B(1)i |∑
i∈[b]wi · 2|B(1)i |
= n.
It only remains to prove that this strategy is (α/8, 1/2)-maximin. Assume for the sake of contradiction that
player 2 has a strategy y that prevents both x and x′ from achieving a payoff of at least α/8. We can assume
w.l.o.g., that for every battlefield i, we have yi ∈ {0, xi, x′i}, thus, on all battlefields that are ignored (i.e.,
xi = x
′
i = 0), we have yi = 0. Further, note that because of the special construction of strategies x and x′,
in each battlefield, at most one of x or x′ put non-zero troops; therefore, on every battlefield i where yi > 0,
either we have xi > 0 or x′i > 0. Define
m1 =
∑
i∈[k]:xi>0
yi, and, m2 =
∑
i∈[k]:x′i>0
yi.
Note that m1 + m2 ≤ m since it cannot be the case that both xi and x′i are non-zero at the same time as
described above. Therefore at least one ofm1 orm2 is not more thanm/2. Assume w.l.o.g., thatm1 ≤ m/2.
One can think of m1 as the number of troops that are spent by player 2 to prevent strategy x from getting
a payoff of at least α/8. To obtain the contradiction, we prove that player 2 cannot use only m/2 troops
to prevent x from obtaining a payoff of α/8. Recall that we denote the total sum of battlefields on which
we put a non-zero number of troops either in x or x′ by α′. Strategy x puts non-zero troops in half of these
battlefields, and therefore sum of their weights is at least α′/2. To prevent x from getting a payoff of at least
α/8, player 2 can lose a weight of less than α/8 on these battlefields. Let Y be the subset of battlefields
on which y wins x and let w(Y) be the total weight of all these battlefields. We need to have
w(Y) > α′/2− α/8. (10)
Since the number of troops that is put on the battlefields in x is proportional to the battlefield weights on
which x puts non-zero troops, we have
∑
i∈Y
xi ≥
(w(Y)
α′/2
)
n
By (10)
≥
(α′/2− α/8
α′/2
)
n ≥
(
1− α
4α′
)
n
By (9)
≥
(
1− 
4(1− δ)
)
n
Since δ = 3/10
≥ n
1 + 
.
Therefore, to be able to match the troops of x in every battlefield in Y , using onlym/2 troops, we have
m/2 ≥
∑
i∈Y
xi ≥ n
1 + 
. (11)
The last inequality contradicts the assumption of the lemma that n > (1 + )m/2. Therefore, there exists no
such strategy y for player 2. That means, the constructed strategy is indeed a (α/8, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy.
Theorem 5.9. Let  > 0 be an arbitrarily small constant and suppose that we have an instance of continuous
Colonel Blotto in which n ≥ (1 + )m/2. Given that player 1 has a (u, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy, there exists
an algorithm that finds a ((1− )u, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy for him in polynomial time.
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Proof. The algorithm to achieve this strategy is given as Algorithm 1. We first analyze the approximation
factor of Algorithm 1 and then prove that it runs in polynomial time.
Approximation factor. Let w′ denote the updated battlefield weights by the end of Line 2 of Algorithm 1.
First note that setting a cap of u for the battlefield weights in the first line of algorithm does not change
the game instance at all since the only goal of player 1 is to guarantee a payoff of at least u. Second,
we know by Observation 5.7 that for any u′, any (u′, p)-maximin strategy for the δ-uniform variant is a
((1 − δ)u′, p)-maximin strategy for the original (i.e., not δ-uniform) instance. Roughly speaking, since δ is
relatively smaller than , we still get a ((1− )u, 1/2)-maximin strategy for the original instance if we achieve
a good approximation on the δ-uniform variant.
Consider an optimal (u, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy for player 1 on the original instance (which recall is
guaranteed to exist) and assume that it randomizes over two pure strategies xˆ and xˆ′. By Observation 5.7,
this is a ((1− δ)u, 1/2)-maximin strategy for the δ-uniform variant. Let us denote by vector c ∈ {≤,≥}k the
comparison between the entries of xˆ and xˆ′. That is, ci is ‘≥’ if and only if xˆi ≥ xˆ′i and it is ‘≤’ otherwise.
Our goal is to argue that there exists a guess g ∈ G that is sufficiently close to c — where by sufficiently
close we mean sum of weights of all battlefields with gi 6= ci is very small. We will later combine this with
Lemma 5.6 to obtain the desired guarantee.
We first assume w.l.o.g. that for any two battlefields i and j with i ≤ j that have the same weight, if
ci 6= cj , then ci = ‘≤’ and cj = ‘≥’ (otherwise we swap these two battlefields without changing the payoff
guaranteed by the strategy). We have two relaxations over the guesses in Lines 3 and 6 of Algorithm 1.
First, in Line 3 of Algorithm 1, sum of weights of all light battlefields with weight at most δu/k is not
more than δu since k is the total number of battlefields. Thus, even if gi 6= ci on these battlefields, their total
sum is less than δu.
Second, in Line 6 of Algorithm 1, let us denote by α the sum of weights of all battlefields whose bucket
contains more than 1/δ battlefields. Observe that we check almost all possibilities of guesses on these buck-
ets, except on δ fraction of their battlefields. More precisely, the total sum of weights of such battlefields on
which our guess is wrong is at most δα. It only remains to argue that δα cannot be very large. Note that by
Lemma 5.8, we can obtain a simple (α/8, 1/2)-maximin strategy since the condition of n ≥ (1 + )m/2 is
also satisfied here. Thus, we can assume u ≥ α/8 or simply α ≤ 8u/ (otherwise instead of Algorithm 1
we return the strategy of Lemma 5.8). Therefore the total weight of battlefields of this type, on which we
guess wrong is no more than
δα ≤ δ8u

Since δ = 3/10
≤ 4
5
2u.
Combining these two, we show that there exists a guess g ∈ G for which sum of battlefields with gi 6= ci
is at most
δu+
4
5
2u =
1
10
3u+
4
5
2u < 2u.
By Lemma 5.6, this implies a ((1 − δ)u − 2u, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy for the δ-uniform variant; and by
Observation 5.7, guarantees a utility of at least
(1− δ − 2)(1− δ)u = (1− 
3
10
− 2)(1− 
3
10
)u ≥ (1− )u
for the original instance with probability at least 1/2, which in other words, gives a ((1 − )u, 1/2)-maximin
2-strategy as desired.
Running time. It is easy to confirm that the running time of Algorithm 1 is poly(|G|). Thus, it suffices to
show that the total number of guesses in G is polynomial. Observe that for any i ∈ [b], the total number of
partial guesses for bucket i is O(1) (though dependent on δ). On the other hand, the total number of buckets
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as mentioned before is at most O(log k) (we hide the dependence on δ) therefore |G| ≤ O(1)O(log k) which
is polynomial.
Notice that when n ≤ m/2, there is no chance for player 1 to get a nonzero utility by randomizing over
two pure strategies since player 2 can always play yi = max{xi, x′i} troops on every every battlefield and
win all of them.
5.2 Generalization to the Case of c-Strategies for c > 2
In this section we generalize our results for the continuous variant to the case of multiple (i.e., more than 2)
strategies in the support. That is, for a given u, we seek to find a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy x for maximum
possible p. Throughout the section, we denote the support of x by x1, . . . ,xc.
We showed that the only computationally challenging problem for the case of 2-strategies is when our
goal is to find (u, 1/2)-maximin strategies. For that we only needed to give two pure strategies x1 and x2 and
make sure that against every pure strategy of the opponent, at least one of these strategies obtains a utility of
at least u. This structure becomes more complicated when we allow more than 2 strategies in the support.
Consider, for instance, the case of 3-strategies and suppose for simplicity that we are promised that the three
pure strategies in the support of an optimal strategy are each played with probability 1⁄3. For this example,
the computationally challenging cases are obtaining either a (u, 2/3)-maximin strategy or a (u, 1/3)-maximin
strategy. For the former case, we need to make sure that against every strategy of the opponent at least 2 of
the strategies in the support obtain a utility of at least u. For the latter it suffices for 1 of the strategies to
obtain a utility of at least u. The idea is to first attempt to find a (u, 2/3)-maximin. It could be the case that
no such strategy exists; if so, we then attempt to find a (u, 1/3)-maximin strategy.
To generalize this to more than 3 strategies, we use the notion of non-losing sets.
Definition 5.10 (Non-losing sets). Consider a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy x with support x1, . . . ,xc. We
define a setN ∈ [c] to be a non-losing set of x if for every strategy y of player 2 there exists some i ∈ N for
which u1(xi,y) ≥ u. A setN ∈ [c] is a minimal non-losing set of x if it is a non-losing set of x and there is
no strict subset N ′ ( N of N that is a non-losing set of x. We denote the set of all minimal non-losing sets
of a strategy x by N (x).
Observe that for a (u, 1/2)-maximin 2-strategy, its only minimal non-losing set is {1, 2}. Moreover, for
our example of a (u, p)-maximin 3-strategy, if p = 2/3, the minimal non-losing sets are {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}.
In the same example, if p = 1/3, the only minimal non-losing set is {1, 2, 3}.
The general structure of our algorithm is to first guess the set of all minimal non-losing sets N and see
whether it is possible to satisfy it by constructing the pure strategies x1, . . . ,xc in such a way that we get
N (x) = N . Recall that there are only a constant number of possibilities for the choice of N since it is a
subset of the power set of [c] and c is constant. We also know by Lemma 4.5 that having N (x) is sufficient
to decide what is the best way to assign probabilities to strategies x1, . . . ,xc as it uniquely determines the
winning subsets. Therefore we can find the optimal c-strategy if for a given choice of N we can decide in
polynomial time whether it is satisfiable or not.
Now, given that our guess N is fixed, we need to find strategies x1, . . . ,xc in such a way that every
N ∈ N is indeed a nonlosing set. This gives the following formulation of the problem.
find x1, . . . ,xc
subject to xji ≥ 0 ∀i, j : i ∈ [k], j ∈ [c]∑
i∈[k] x
j
i ≤ n ∀j ∈ [c]
for some i ∈ N we have u1(xi,y) ≥ u ∀y ∈ S2,∀N ∈ N
(12)
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Program 12 is in fact the generalization of Program 4 to the case of c-strategies. Clearly, the last constraint in
its current form is not linear. We showed how Program 4 can be decomposed into a set of convex polytopes
and how each of them can be solved in polynomial time via the definition of critical tuples. We follow a
similar approach and give a generalized definition of critical tuples.
Definition 5.11 (Critical tuples). Consider a tuple W = (W1, . . . ,Wk) where each Wi is a subset of [c].
We callW a critical tuple if and only if for some N ∈ N we have∑
i:j∈Wi
wi < u ∀j ∈ N.
Consider a tupleW = (W1, . . . ,Wk). Fix a strategyy of player 2, and assumex1, . . . ,xc are constructed
in such a way that xji > yi iff j ∈ Wi. In other words,Wi is the set of indices of the strategies that win the
ith battlefield against y. NowW is a critical tuple iff x1, . . . ,xc do not satisfy N . More precisely,W is a
critical tuple iff all of the strategies in one of the minimal non-losing sets ofN lose (i.e., get a payoff of less
than u) against y.
Before describing howwe can use critical tuples in rewriting Program 12, we need to know precisely how
for each i ∈ [k], the values of x1i , x2i , . . . , xci compare to each other. To that end, we define a configuration
G to be a vector of k matrices G1, . . . , Gk which we call partial configurations, where for any i ∈ [k], and
for any j1, j2 ∈ [c], the value of Gi(j1, j2) is ‘≤’ if xj1i ≤ xj2i and it is ‘≥’ otherwise.
Clearly if we fix the configuration G of strategies a priori, it is possible to ensure the found strategies
comply with it viaO(kc2) linear constraints. It suffices to have one constraint for everyGi(j1, j2). The linear
program below shows that if the configuration is fixed, we can even rewrite Program 12 as a linear program.
For configurationG and critical tupleW, define zi(G,W) := arg maxj:j 6∈Wi x
j
i . Note that it is crucial that
zi(G,W) is solely a function of G and W (and not the actual strategies x1, . . . ,xc) so long as strategies
x1, . . . ,xc comply withG.
find x1, . . . ,xc
subject to xji ≥ 0 ∀i, j : i ∈ [k], j ∈ [c]∑
i∈[k] x
j
i ≤ n ∀j ∈ [c]
ensure that x1, . . . ,xc comply withG∑
i∈[k] x
zi(G,W)
i > m for every critical tupleW = (W1, . . . ,Wk)
(13)
The intuition behind the last constraint is that for player 2 to be able to enforce any critical tuple to happen,
he needs to have more than m troops. This is a sufficient and necessary condition to ensure that all of the
non-losing sets inN are satisfied. Observe that if our guess forN is wrong, for every configurationG, LP 13
will be infeasible.
The takeaway fromLP 13, is that if we fix the configurationG, the solution space becomes convex and can
be described via linear constraints. Although there may be exponentially many critical tuplesW and, thus,
exponentially many constraints in LP 13, one can design an appropriate separating oracle and use ellipsoid
method to solve it in polynomial time using a dynamic programming approach similar to the one used for
solving LP 6. Therefore one algorithm to solve the problem is to iterate over all possible configurations,
solve LP 13 for each and report the best solution. This gives us an exponential time algorithm with running
time (c!)k. Recall that we followed a rather similar approach for the case of 2-strategies and showed that the
solution space can be decomposed to 2k convex polytopes. To overcome this when c = 2, we showed how it
is possible to only consider polynomially many such polytopes as far as the problem is concerned. We follow
the same approach here.
Let us start with uniform setting where all the battlefield weights are the same. Since the players are both
indifferent to the battlefields in the uniform setting, instead of individually fixing the partial configuration of
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each battlefield, it only suffices to know the number of battlefields having a particular partial configuration.
Note that each partial configuration, e.g., G1, is determined uniquely if we are given the sorted order of
x11, x
2
1, . . . , x
c
1. Therefore, there are a total number of c! = O(1) possibilities for each partial configuration.
This means, if we only count the number of battlefields having each partial configuration, we reduce the
total number of considered configurations down to a polynomial (O(kc!) to be more precise). This gives a
polynomial time algorithm for the uniform case.
Generalization to the case where the weights are not are equal follows from similar ideas described in
Section 5.1.2. That is, we can consider the δ-uniform variant of the game for a relatively smaller error
threshold than  and group battlefields into buckets with each bucket containing the battlefields of the same
updated weight. Then in each bucket, similar to the uniform case, it suffices to only count the number of
battlefields of each configuration. Recall, however, that the crucial property for this idea to work was to show
that for each bucket, it suffices to check only a constant number of different possibilities. Naively, the number
of possibilities for each bucket is kO(1)i . Therefore, if ki ≤ 1/δ it is bounded byO(1) as desired. However, if
ki > 1/δ, the idea, similar to Section 5.1.2, is to discretize the number of battlefields having one particular
partial configuration ofGj to be in set {0, δki, 2δki, . . . , ki}. This way, a similar argument as in Lemma 5.8
shows that making a mistake on only a δ fraction of buckets with at least 1/δ battlefields is negligible so long
as our goal is to guarantee a utility of (1− )u, resulting in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.12. Let  > 0 be an arbitrarily small constant. Given that player 1 in an instance of continuous
Colonel Blotto has a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy for a constant c, and given that n ≥ (1+)m/b(1−p)c+1c,
there exists an algorithm that finds a ((1− )u, p)-maximin c-strategy for him in polynomial time.
We remark that if n ≤ m/b(1− p)c+ 1c, then player 1 has no (u, p)-maximin strategy.
6 Discrete Colonel Blotto
In this section we focus on the discrete variant of Colonel Blotto. Though similar in spirit to the continuous
variant, discrete Colonel Blotto is an inherently different game (especially from a computational perspective)
and requires different techniques.
6.1 The Case of One Strategy
Similar to the continuous variant, we start with the case where the support size is bounded by 1. We showed
how for the continuous case, it is possible to obtain an optimal (u, 1)-maximin strategy by solving LP 3.
Observe, however, that variable xi in LP 3 denotes the number of troops in battlefield i; this implies that
LP 3 relies crucially on the fact that a fractional number of troops in a battlefield is allowed. As such, the
same idea cannot be applied to the discrete case since the integer variant of LP 3 is not necessarily solvable
in polynomial time.
Prior algorithm of [3] gives a 2-approximation for this problem, i.e., given that there exists a (u, 1)-maximin
strategy for player 1, they give a (u/2, 1)-maximin strategy in polynomial time. We improve this result by
obtaining an almost optimal solution in polynomial time.
Theorem 6.1. Given that player 1 has a (u, 1)-maximin strategy, there exists a polynomial time algorithm
that obtains a ((1− )u, 1)-maximin strategy of player 1 for any arbitrarily small constant  > 0.
The algorithm in a nutshell. The algorithm that we use to prove Theorem 6.1 is composed of three main
steps. In step 1, we round down the battlefield weights to be powers of (1 + /2), i.e., we consider the (/2)-
uniform variant of the game. The goal here is to reduce the number of distinct battlefield weights. As it was
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previously shown, by optimizing over this updated instance of the game, player 1 does not lose a considerable
payoff on the original instance.
In step 2, we partition the battlefields into two subsets: light battlefields that have a weight of at most
(/2)u and heavy battlefields that each has a weight of more than (/2)u. Roughly speaking, the goal is to
separate battlefields that have a high impact on the outcome of the game from the lower weight ones. We
show that as a result of step 1, we can give a new representation for strategies of player 1 that reduces the
total number of partial strategies of player 1 on heavy battlefields down to a polynomial. We further show
that for any strategy of player 1 on heavy battlefields, player 2 has only a constant number of valid responses
as far as the optimal solution is concerned. Importantly, bounding the number of responses of player 2 by a
constant has a crucial role in solving the problem in polynomial time — we will elaborate more on this in
the next paragraph.
In step 3, we propose a weaker adversary than player 2. Roughly speaking, we assume that for any
given strategy of player 1, the weaker adversary responds greedily on light battlefields (though we do not
limit him on heavy battlefields). We show that optimizing player 1’s strategy against this weaker adversary
guarantees an acceptable payoff against the actual adversary (i.e., player 2). In brief, the main advantage
of optimizing player 1’s strategy against the weaker adversary is in that it allows us to exploit the more
predictable greedy response of the opponent. Recall, however, that we do not limit the weaker adversary on
heavy battlefields and, therefore, his response to a strategy that we give for player 1 may still come from a
somewhat unpredictable function. However, step 2 guarantees that for every strategy of player 1, it suffices
to consider only a constant number of responses of the weaker adversary. This allows us to use a dynamic
program that has, roughly, the same number of dimensions as the number of strategies of theweaker adversary
and solve the problem in polynomial time.
Basic structural properties. Recall that a (u, 1)-maximin strategy guarantees a payoff of u against any
strategy of player 2. Therefore, if u > 0, we need to have n > m; or otherwise, no matter what pure strategy
the first player chooses, the second player can match the number of troops of the first player in all battlefields
and win them all. Now, assuming that n > m, if there exists one battlefield with weight at least u, the first
player can simply put all his troops in that battlefield and guarantee a payoff of at least u. Therefore we
assume throughout the rest of the section that n > m and that the maximum battlefield weight is less than u.
Step 1: Updating the battlefield weights. We first round down the weight of each of the battlefields to be in
setW = {1, (1 + /2)1, (1 + /2)2, . . .} and denote the modified weights vector byw′. That is, we consider
the (/2)-uniform variant of the game (see Section 5 and Observation 5.7 for the formal definition).
Corollary 6.2 (of Observation 5.7). For anyu′, any (u′, 1)-maximin strategy of the game instanceB(n,m,w′)
with the updated weights is a ((1− /2)u′, 1)-maximin strategy of the original instance B(n,m,w).
Corollary 6.2 implies that to obtain a ((1−)u, 1)-maximin strategy on the original instance B(n,m,w),
it suffices to find a ((1− /2)u, 1)-maximin strategy on instance B(n,m,w′). Therefore, from now on, we
only focus on the instance with the updated weights and, for simplicity of notations, denote the updated
weight of battlefield i by wi.
Updating the battlefield weights in the aforementioned way results in reducing the total number of distinct
weights down to O(1/ · log u) (recall that the maximum weight among original weights was assumed to be
at most u). We later show how this can be used to represent pure strategies of player 1 in a different way that
results in a significantly fewer number of strategies.
Step 2: Partitioning the battlefields into heavy and light subsets. We set a threshold τ = u/2 and
partition the battlefields into two subsets of heavy battlefields with weights of at least τ and light battlefields
with weights of less than τ . Roughly speaking, for light battlefields, we can afford to be the weight of one
battlefield away from the optimal strategy and remain (1 − /2)-competitive since the maximum weight
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among them is bounded by u/2. For the heavy battlefields, however, we need to be more careful as even
one battlefield might have a huge impact on the outcome of the game. The idea is to significantly reduce the
number of strategies of the players that have to be considered on heavy battlefields so that we can consider
them all. Let us denote by kd the number of distinct battlefield weights; further, we denote by khd the number
of distinct battlefield weights that are larger than τ (i.e., are heavy). The following observation bounds khd by
a constant.
Observation 6.3. The number of distinct heavy battlefield weights, khd , is bounded by a constant.
Proof. Recall that we assume no battlefield has weight more than u. Moreover, all heavy battlefields have
weight at least u/2. Since we updated the weight of all battlefields to be in set {1, (1+/2)1, (1+/2)2, . . .},
it leaves only log1+/2(2/) =
log(2/)
log(1+/2) ≤ 4/ · log(2/) values in range [u/2, u] which is a constant
number since  is a constant.
We show by Claim 6.4 that there always exists an optimal strategy that puts roughly the same number of
troops in all battlefields of the same weight. Intuitively, the players are indifferent to battlefields of the same
weights and therefore the first player has no incentive to put significantly more troops on one of them.
Claim 6.4. If player 1 has a (u, 1)-maximin strategy, he also has a (u, 1)-maximin strategy x where for any
two battlefields i and j with wi = wj , we have |xi − xj | ≤ 1.
Proof. Consider two battlefields j and j′ with the same weights and assume that for (u, 1)-maximin strategy
xˆ, we have xˆj ≥ xˆj′ + 2. We construct another strategy x′ in the following way: x′j = xˆj − 1, x′j′ = xˆj′ + 1,
and x′i = xˆi for all other battlefields. It is easy to confirm that x′ is also a (u, 1)-maximin strategy. Applying
the same function to x′, we can inductively update the strategy to finally achieve a strategy (u, 1)-maximin
strategy x for which we have |xi − xj | ≥ 1 for all battlefields of the same weight.
Now, the idea is to represent the pure strategies of player 1 differently. That is, instead of specifying the
number of troops that are put on each battlefield, we represent each valid pure strategy of player 1 by the
number of troops that are put on each battlefield weight. By Claim 6.4, this uniquely determines an optimal
strategy without loss of generality. Therefore the dimension of each pure strategies of player 1 is now changed
from k to O(1/ · log u). Note that this is not sufficient to solve the problem in polynomial time since the
number of pure strategies of player 1 can still be up to nO(1/·log u). However, we show how this can bound
the number of pure strategies of player 1 on heavy battlefields.
We define a partial strategy of player 1 on heavy battlefields to be a strategy in the new representation
that only specifies how player 1 plays on heavy battlefields. Formally, each partial strategy of player 1 on
heavy battlefields can be represented by a vector xh of length khd , with non-negative entries in [n] that sum
up to at most n. Let us denote the set of all such strategies by Sh1 . The following observation bounds the
total number of strategies in Sh1 .
Observation 6.5. |Sh1 | ≤ npoly(1/).
Proof. Since byObservation 6.3, khd ≤ poly(1/), each strategy inSh1 is a vector of length at most poly(1/).
This, combined with the fact that each entry is an integer between 0 and n, leads to the desired bound.
A similar analysis can show that the strategies of player 2 can also be bounded by a polynomial on heavy
battlefields; however, for technical reasons that we will elaborate on later, it is crucial to further bound the
number of pure strategies of player 2 on heavy battlefields by a constant. The key idea here, is that to prevent
player 1 from achieving a payoff of u, player 2 can only lose in at most 2/ heavy battlefields. Similar to
that of player 1, we represent each partial strategy of player 2 on heavy battlefields by a vector of length khd .
However, instead of specifying the number of troops that player 2 puts on each battlefield weight, we only
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specify how many battlefields of each weight player 2 loses in. Therefore, formally, each partial strategy of
player 2 on heavy battlefields can be represented by a vector of length khd where each entry is a non-negative
integer and all entries sum up to at most 2/. Denoting the set of all these partial strategies by Sh2 , we can
bound its size to be a constant.
Observation 6.6. |Sh2 | ≤ O(1).
Proof. By Observation 6.3, the vectors in Sh2 have khd ≤ poly(1/) dimensions and each entry is a number
in [0, 2/] therefore there are at most poly(1/)2/+1 such vectors which is O(1) since  is a constant.
Step 3: Solving the problem against a weaker adversary. Given a strategy x of player 1, the second
player’s best response is a strategy that maximizes his payoff. That is, player 2 seeks to find a strategy
y ∈ S2 such that u2(x,y), which is the weight of the battlefields in which y puts more troops than x, is
maximized. This is precisely equivalent to the following knapsack problem: The knapsack has capacity
m (the number of troops of player 2) and for any i ∈ [k], there exists an item with weight xi and value
wi. Indeed one of the main challenges in finding an optimal (u, 1)-maximin strategy for player 1 is in that
the second player’s best response problem is a rather complicated function that makes it hard for the first
player to optimize his strategy against. To resolve this issue, we optimize player 1’s strategy against a weaker
adversary than player 2. That is, we assume that the second player, instead of solving the aforementioned
knapsack problem optimally, follows a simpler and more predictable algorithm. Note that there is a trade-off
on the best-response algorithm that we fix for the weaker adversary. If it is too simplified, the strategy that
we find for player 1 against it cannot perform well against player 2 who best-responds optimally; and if it is
not simplified enough, there is no gain in considering the weaker adversary instead of player 2. To balance
this, we allow the weak adversary to try all possible strategies on heavy battlefields, but only allow him to
combine it with a greedy algorithm on light battlefields; this process is formalized in Algorithm 2.7 As we
show in the rest of this section, while being only  away from the optimal best-response algorithm, it becomes
possible to compute an optimal strategy of player 1 against the weak adversary who responds by Algorithm 2
in polynomial time.
Algorithm 2Weaker adversary’s best response algorithm.
Input: a strategy x = (x1, . . . , xk) of player 1.
Output: a strategy y = (y1, . . . , yk) of player 2.
1: For every battlefield i, denote its ratio ri to be wi/xi.
2: Let σ(i) denote the index of the ith light battlefield with the highest ratio.
3: y← (0, . . . , 0)
4: for every possible strategy y′ of player 2 that puts non-zero troops only on heavy battlefields do
5: i← 1
6: whilem−∑i y′i ≥ xσ(i) and i ≤ k do . Play greedily on light battlefields based on their ratios.
7: y′σ(i) ← xσ(i)
8: i← i+ 1
9: end while
10: if u2(x,y′) ≥ u2(x,y) then update y← y′
11: end for
12: return y
7For ease of exposition, we do not explicitly mention how to sort the battlefields when two have the same ratio in Algorithm 2.
This can be simply handled by assuming that the battlefield with a lower index is preferred by the weaker adversary.
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Lemma 6.7. For any strategy x of player 1, let y be the optimal best-response of player 2 and let y˜ be the
strategy obtained by Algorithm 2. We have u2(x, y˜) ≥ u2(x,y)− u2 .
Proof. Consider the iteration of the for loop in Algorithm 2 where the chosen partial strategy y′ over the
heavy battlefields is exactly equal to that of the optimal best-response y of player 2. We claim that after
this strategy is combined with the greedy algorithm over light battlefields to obtain a potential strategy p, it
provides a payoff of at least u2(x,y)−u/2. Note that this is sufficient to prove the lemma since the returned
solution y guarantees a payoff against x that is not less than that of p.
Observe that we can safely ignore heavy battlefields since both y and p choose similar strategies over
them. It only suffices to guarantee that the difference over light battlefields is at most u/2. Let us denote
by m′ the number of troops that are left for player 2 over light battlefields. The optimal best-response is
equivalent to the solution of the following knapsack problem: The knapsack has capacity m′, and for each
light battlefield i, there is an item with cost xi (since player 2 has to put at least xi troops to win it) and value
wi. Observe that the greedy approach of the weaker-adversary on light battlefields, is equivalent to a greedy
algorithm for this knapsack problem where items are sorted based on their value per weight (i.e., wi/xi) and
chosen greedily. This is in fact, the well-known greedy algorithm of knapsack that is known to guarantee
an additive error of up to the maximum item value. Since here we only consider light battlefields and the
maximum item value, or equivalently, the maximum battlefield weight is at most u/2, we lose an additive
error of at most u/2 compared to optimal strategy y, which concludes the proof.
Corollary 6.8. Any strategy x of player 1 that obtains a payoff of u against the weaker adversary, obtains a
payoff of at least (1− /2)u against all possible strategies of player 2.
Proof. Since the game is constant sum with
∑
iwi being sum of utilities, the weaker adversary gets a payoff
of at most
∑
iwi−u against x. Therefore since by Lemma 6.7 the optimal best response of player 2 obtains
a payoff of at most
∑
iwi − u + u/2. This means that the first player gets a payoff of at least u − u/2 =
(1− /2)u against any strategy of the second player.
By Corollary 6.8, to obtain the desired ((1 − /2)u, 1)-maximin strategy, it suffices to guarantee a pay-
off of u against the weaker adversary. Note that such strategy is guaranteed to exist since existence of a
(u, 1)-maximin strategy against player 2 is guaranteed.
A wrong approach. We start with a wrong approach in guaranteeing a payoff of u against the weaker ad-
versary and later show how to fix its shortcomings. Observe that the weaker adversary exhaustively searches
through all of his possible strategies among heavy battlefields and plays greedily on light battlefields. There-
fore, the first player needs to approach heavy and light battlefields differently. One way of doing this is to fix
the number of troops that each of the players will spend on heavy and light battlefields, which is bounded by
O(nm), and solve two instances independently. On light battlefields, since player 2 responds greedily, it is
not hard to optimize the first player’s strategy. On heavy battlefields, the number of pairs of valid strategies
of the players are bounded by a polynomial by Observations 6.26 and 6.27. Therefore, player 1 can find his
optimal strategy among them by exhaustively checking all of his strategies against all possible responses of
player 2.
The problem with this approach, is that it is not possible to solve the subproblems on heavy and light
battlefields independently. More precisely, the number of troops that player 2 puts on heavy and light battle-
fields is a direct function of the strategy of player 1. This implies that it is not possible to fix the number of
troops of player 2 over heavy and light battlefields a priori, without specifying the exact strategy of player 1.
The correct approach. To resolve the aforementioned problem, we do not fix the budget of player 2 on
light and heavy battlefields beforehand. Instead, we first only fix the strategy xh ∈ Sh1 of player 1 on heavy
battlefields. (By Observation 6.26 there are only polynomially many such strategies, therefore it is possible
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to try them all.) Next, note that player 2, by Observation 6.27, has only a constant number of responses to
xh that we would have to consider (other responses simply guarantee us a payoff of u on heavy battlefields
alone). Roughly speaking, while finding the optimal strategy of player 1 on light battlefields, we would have
to consider all these responses of player 2 on heavy battlefields. That is, each response yh ∈ Sh2 of player
2 on heavy battlefields uniquely determines (1) what payoff the players get on heavy battlefields, (2) how
many troops is left for player 2 to play on light battlefields. The strategy that we find for player 1 on light
battlefields, has to perform well against all of these responses.
In a thought experiment, consider the optimal strategy x` of player 1 on light battlefields, given that his
strategy on heavy battlefields is fixed to be xh. For every strategy yh of player 2 on heavy battlefields, the
greedy algorithm of player 2 on light battlefields first sorts light battlefields based on their ratios wi/x`i and
greedily wins battlefields of higher ratio. This means that for every response of player 2 on heavy battlefields,
there is a unique light battlefield of highest ratio that player 2 loses in. Let us denote by bi the index of this
battlefield for the ith response of player 2 in Sh2 . We also denote by ri := wbi/x`bi the ratio of battlefield bi
based on x`. The takeaway, here, is that given the optimal strategy x` of player 2 on light battlefields, we can
uniquely determine vectors b = (b1, b2, . . . , b|Sh2 |) and r = (r1, r2, . . . , r|Sh2 |). We have no way of knowing
these vectors without knowing x`, however, we find the right value of them by checking all possible vectors.
To achieve this, the first step is to show that there are only polynomially many options that we need to try.
Claim 6.9. There are only polynomially many valid triplets (xh,b, r).
Proof. We already know from Observation 6.26 that there are only polynomially many possible choices for
xh. To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that for the choice of b and r, we also have polynomially many
possibilities. To see this, note that b and r only have |Sh2 | dimensions which is bounded by a constant by
Observation 6.27. Furthermore, each entry of b is a number in {0, 1, . . . , k} and each entry of r has at most
O(nk) values. This means there are only kO(1) many possibilities for b and (nk)O(1) many possibilities
for r. Both of these upper bounds are polynomial, which proves there are only polynomially many triplets
(xh,b, r).
The next step is to find a strategy x` of player 1 on light battlefields that satisfies a given triplet (xh,b, r).
We start by formalizing what satisfying exactly means.
Definition 6.10. We say a strategy x` of player 1 on light battlefields satisfies a triplet (xh,b, r) if the
following conditions hold.
1. The number of troops that are used in x` is at most n−∑i xhi .
2. If player 2 chooses his ith strategy from Sh2 over heavy battlefields and plays greedily (according to
Algorithm 2) on light battlefields, the highest ratio light battlefield in which he loses becomes bi.
3. The ratio wbi/x`bi is indeed equal to ri.
Note that it is not necessarily possible to satisfy any given triplet (xh,b, r). However, it is guaranteed that
the right choice of it, where xh corresponds to the optimal partial strategy of player 1 on heavy battlefields
and b and r correspond to their actual value (as described before) for the optimal strategy of player 1, is
satisfiable. Recall that our goal is to exhaustively try all possible triplets and find the optimal one. To achieve
this, we need an oracle that confirmswhether a given triplet is satisfiable. Lemma 6.11 provides this oracle via
a dynamic program that further guarantees that the obtained strategy is maximin against the weak adversary
given that player 1 is committed to satisfy (xh,b, r).
Lemma 6.11. Given a triplet T = (xh,b, r), one can in polynomial time, either report that T is not satis-
fiable, or find a strategy x` that satisfies T while guaranteeing that the payoff of the response of the weaker
adversary to strategy (xh,x`) of player 1 that is obtained by Algorithm 2 is minimized.
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Proof. For simplicity of notations, let us denote by c := |Sh2 | the total number of responses of player 2 over
the heavy battlefields, and consequently, the size of vectors b and r. Furthermore, given that player 1 plays
strategy xh on heavy battlefields and that player 2 plays his ith response in Sh2 to xh, we denote by mi the
number of troops that are left for player 2 to play on light battlefields, and denote respectively by g1(i) and
g2(i) the guaranteed payoff that players 1 and 2 get on heavy battlefields.
To satisfy condition 1 of Definition 6.10, we ensure that the strategy that we find for player 1 over the
light battlefields only uses n` := n −∑i xhi troops. Satisfying the third condition is also straightforward:
for any i ∈ [c], it suffices for player 1 to put exactly wbi/ri troops on battlefield bi. (We emphasize that
we should not change the number of troops on these battlefields throughout the algorithm.) If during this
process, we need to use more than n` troops or if for some i and j we have bi = bj and wbi/ri 6= wbj/rj
we report that the given triplet is not satisfiable. The main difficulty is to ensure that the second condition
of Definition 6.10 also holds. For that, the only decision that we have to make is on the number of troops
that we put on the remaining battlefields. For our final strategy x` over the light battlefields, assume that
the battlefields are sorted decreasingly based on their ratio wi/x`i and let us denote by σ(i) the index of the
battlefield in position i. To convey the overall idea of how to satisfy this condition, let us first focus on the
ith strategy of player 2 over the heavy battlefields. We need to make sure that in our strategy x` over light
battlefields, the ratio of battlefields are such that if player 2 wins them greedily, he stops at battlefield bi.
More precisely, let σ(γ) = bi, we need to have8
0 ≤ mi −
γ−1∑
j=1
x`σ(j) < x
`
bi
. (14)
Fix battlefield bi, roughly speaking, in order to satisfy (14), we need to decide which battlefields will have a
higher ratio than battlefield bi so as to ensure that once player 2 wins them, he will have less than x`bi troops.
Now recall that we need to satisfy this, simultaneously, for every entry bi of b. For this we use a dynamic
program D(j, n′, ω1, . . . , ωc, u1, . . . , uc) with j ∈ {0, . . . , k`}, n′ ∈ {0, , . . . , n`}, ui ∈ {0, . . . ,
∑
iwi},
and ωi ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,mi}. The value of D(j, n′, ω1, . . . , ωc, u1, . . . , uc) is either 0 or 1 and it is 1 iff it is
possible to give a partial strategy (x1, . . . , xj) over the first j light battlefields such that all the following
conditions are satisfied.
1. We use exactly n′ troops over them, i.e., ∑
j′∈[j]
xj′ = n
′. (15)
2. For any i ∈ [c], we put at least ωi troops in battlefields with ratio higher than ri, i.e.,∑
j′∈[j]:wj′
xj′
≥ri
xj′ ≥ ωi, ∀i ∈ [c]. (16)
3. For any i ∈ [c], sum of weights of battlefields with lower ratio than ri is at least ui − g1(i), i.e.,∑
j′∈[j]:wj′
xj′
<ri
wj′ ≥ ui − g1(i), ∀i ∈ [c]. (17)
8In case of a tie, we assume the battlefield with the lower index has a higher ratio.
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It is easy to confirm, by definition, that we can satisfy (xh,b, r) iff,
D(k`, n`,m1 − x`b1 − 1, . . . ,mc − x`bc − 1, 0, . . . , 0) = 1.
To further maximize the payoff that player 1 gets against the weaker adversary as well as satisfying the given
triplet it suffices to find the maximum value of u where
D(k`, n`,m1 − x`b1 − 1, . . . ,mc − x`bc − 1, u, . . . , u) = 1.
Base case. We start with the base case, where j = 0. Here, clearly, if ωi > 0 or ui > 0 for some i, then the
value ofD must be 0 as we have no way of satisfying (16) or (17). Moreover, if n′ > 0, the value must again
be 0, as (15) requires that we need to spend exactly n′ troops over the first j battlefields. Therefore, the only
case where the value of the case where j = 0 is one is where n′ = 0, and ωi = 0 and ui = 0 for all i ∈ [c].
Updating the DP. To update D(j, n′, ω1, . . . , ωc, u1, . . . , uc), we only have to decide on how many troops
to put on the jth battlefield. The idea is to try all possibilities and check, recursively, whether any of these
choices satisfies the requirements for thy dynamic value to be 1. Let us denote by P = {0, . . . , n′} the set
of all possibilities for the number of troops that we can put on battlefield j. We update D as follows:
D(j, n′, ω1, . . . , ωc, u1, . . . , uc) = max
x∈P
D
(
j − 1, n′ − x, ω1(x, j), . . . , ωc(x, j), u1(x, j), . . . , uc(x, j)
)
where for any i ∈ [c], ωi(x, j) and ui(x, j) are defined as
ωi(x, j) =
{
ωi, if wj/x < rd,
ωi − x, otherwise,
and, ui(x, j) =
{
ui − wj , if wj/x < rd,
ui, otherwise.
Recall that when j = bi for some i ∈ [c], as previously mentioned, to prevent violation of condition 3 of
Definition 6.10, we have to put exactly wj/ri troops on battlefield j. If this is the case, and we cannot afford
wj/ri troops (i.e., if wj/ri > n′), we update D to be 0. If wj/ri ≤ n′, we make an exception for battlefield
j and overload the set P to be {wj/ri} instead of {0, . . . , n′}; the rest of the updating procedure would be
the same.
Correctness. Here, we argue that our updating procedure produces the right answer. We use induction on
the value of j and assume that D(j′, n′, ω1, . . . , ωc, u1, . . . , uc) is correctly updated for j′ < j. We argued
why the base case, where j = 0 is correctly updated. It only suffices to prove for that we correctly update
D(j, n′, ω1, . . . , ωc, u1, . . . , uc). Assume for now thatD(j, n′, ω1, . . . , ωc, u1, . . . , uc) = 1. This implies, by
definition, that there exists a strategy (x1, . . . , xj) over the first j light battlefields that satisfies (15), (16), and
(17). Observe that 0 ≤ xj ≤ n′, and thus, xj ∈ P . Once putting xj troops in battlefield j, ωi(xj , j) denotes
the number of troops that still has to be put on battlefields with higher ratio than ri. Moreover, ui(xj , j)
denotes the requirement for the sum of weights of battlefields with lower ratio than ri. Therefore, by (16),
and (17) we need to haveD
(
j−1, n′−xj , ω1(xj , j), . . . , ωc(xj , j), u1(xj , j), . . . , uc(xj , j)
)
= 1 concluding
this case. On the other hand, if D(j, n′, ω1, . . . , ωc, u1, . . . , uc) = 0, no such strategy (x1, . . . , xj) can be
found, therefore for all choices of xj in P , the requirements over the prior battlefields cannot be satisfied and
D
(
j − 1, n′ − xj , ω1(xj , j), . . . , ωc(xj , j), u1(xj , j), . . . , uc(xj , j)
)
= 0 for all choices of xj ∈ P .
Wrap up. To obtain the strategy (xh,x`) of player 1 that satisfies the triplet (xh,b, r) while providing the
maximum guaranteed payoff against all possible strategies of the weaker adversary, we solve the aforemen-
tioned dynamic program and linear search over [0,
∑
iwi] to find the maximum value of u where
D(k`, n`,m1 − x`b1 − 1, . . . ,mc − x`bc − 1, u, . . . , u) = 1.
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While this only outputs the maximum payoff that can be guaranteed — and not the actual strategy to provide
it — it is easy to construct the strategy using standard DP techniques. Roughly speaking, to achieve this, we
need to slightly modify the DP to also store the actual partial strategy in case its value is 1.
To conclude this section, for any choice of the triplet T = (xh,b, r) for which there are only polynomially
many options by Claim 6.9, we find the optimal strategy of player 1 among light battlefields that satisfies T
if possible. Lemma 6.11 guarantees that the obtained strategy over the light battlefields is indeed the optimal
solution if the choice of triplet T is right. Therefore, it suffices to compare the guaranteed payoff of all
obtained solutions for different triplets and report the one that provides the maximum guaranteed payoff for
player 1. This procedure gives us the optimal strategy of player 1 against the weaker adversary and therefore
it guarantees a payoff of u against him. By Corollary 6.8, this gives a ((1 − /2)u, 1)-maximin strategy
against player 2. Recall that this is achieved over the updated battlefield weights. However, by Corollary 6.2,
any ((1 − /2)u, 1)-maximin strategy of player 1 on updated battlefields, gives a ((1 − )u, 1)-maximin on
the original game instance and this proves the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 6.1 (restated). Given that player 1 has a (u, 1)-maximin strategy, there exists a polynomial time
algorithm that obtains a ((1− )u, 1)-maximin strategy of player 1 for any arbitrarily small constant  > 0.
6.2 The Case of 2-Strategies
In this section we generalize the results of the previous section to the case of 2-strategies. To achieve this we
first design an algorithm that obtains a (u/3, p)-maximin 2-strategy. Then, we use this algorithm and adapt
some of the techniques from Section 6.1 to give an algorithm that finds a ((1− )u, p)-maximin 2-strategy.
The proof of the following theorem which is the main result of this section comes later in the section.
Theorem 6.12. Given that player 1 has a (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy, there exists a polynomial time algorithm
that obtains a ((1− )u, p)-maximin 2-strategy of player 1 for any arbitrarily small constant  > 0.
Given that the first player randomizes over two pure strategies x and x′, the second player’s best re-
sponse is a strategy that maximizes his payoff. That is, player 2 seeks to find a strategy y ∈ S2 such that
min(u2(x,y), u2(x
′,y)) is maximized. In this case, we assume that player 1 cannot guarantee utility u for
himself, otherwise he would just play one pure strategy. Therefore, by Observation 4.3 and Observation 4.4
We can safely assume that in any (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy of the first player p=1/2 holds.
Although, there exist polynomial time algorithms to find the best response of player 2, we still need
simpler algorithms to be able to use them and find an optimal ((1 − )u, p)-maximin 2-strategy for player
1. To this end, we define a new opponent which is a weaker version of the second player and we call it the
greedy opponent. Instead of solving the best response problem optimally, the greedy opponent just takes a
simple greedy approach. We prove that playing against this weaker opponent gives us a (u/3, p)-maximin
2-strategy. To approach that we first give an alternative formulation of the best response problem in which
the solution is represented by two binary vectors. We then relax the integrality condition of elements in
the vectors and design a greedy algorithm that finds the best response of the second player in this case. This
algorithm is the base for the greedy opponent’s strategy. We prove that if the second player takes this approach
he loses at most 2 · wmax payoff compared to his best response strategy. Recall that wmax is the maximum
weight of the battlefields.
To give an alternative formulation of the best response problem, we define a new problem in which any
solution is represent by two vectors of size k. Given strategies x and x′ we first define cost vectors c and c′.
For any battlefield i, if xi ≤ x′i then ci := xi and c′i := x′i − xi. Otherwise, c′i := x′i and ci := xi − x′i.
Roughly speaking, when xi ≤ x′i holds, ci is the number of troops that player 2 needs to put in battlefield i to
win strategy x in this battlefield and c′i is the number of troops that he should add to win both strategies. The
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solution to this problem is two vectors h and h′ that maximizes min(w · h,w · h′) subject to the following
conditions.
1. For any i ∈ [k], elements hi and h′i are binary variables.
2. If xi ≤ x′i, then h′i ≤ hi holds. Otherwise, hi ≤ h′i holds.
3. Also, c · h+ c′ · h′ ≤ m.
Given vectors h and h′, the solution of this problem, one can find a strategy y of player 2 where u = w · h
and u′ = w · h. (Recall that u and u′ respectively denote the utility that strategy y gets against strategies x
and x′.) We claim that if for any i ∈ [k], player 2 puts hi · ci + h′i · c′i troops in battlefield i, then u ≥ w · h
and u′ ≥ w · h hold. Note that by condition 3, he has enough troops to play this strategy. Without loss of
generality, assume that xi ≤ x′i. Therefore, by condition 2, h′i ≤ hi holds. There are three possible cases.
Either both h′i and hi are 0, both are equal to 1, or h′i = 0 and hi = 1. If hi = h′i = 0, then wi · hi and
w′i · h′i are both equal to zero. In the case of hi = 1 and hi = 0, we have hi · ci + h′i · c′i = xi. Therefore, in
battlefield i, player 2 gets utility wi against strategy xi. Also, if hi = h′i = 1, the equality hi ·ci+h′i ·c′i = x′i
holds which means player 2 gets utility wi against both strategies in this battlefield. Thus, in all three cases,
the utility that player 2 gets against strategies x and x′ in battlefield i is receptively at least wi ·hi and at least
w′i · h′i.
Moreover, given any strategy y of player 2, one can give two valid vectors h and h′ such that u = w · h
and u′ = w ·h. Iff yi ≥ xi, let hi := 1. Also iff yi ≥ x′i, we set h′i := 1. Therefore, u = w ·h and u′ = w ·h
hold. We also need to show that c · h+ c′ · h′ ≤ m. For this, it suffices to show ci ·hi + c′i ·h′i ≤ yi for any
i ∈ [k]. Without loss of generality, assume that xi ≤ x′i. Thus, ci = xi and c′i = x′i − xi hold. Note that we
can assume that yi is either 0, xi or x′i. In all these three cases, ci · hi + c′i · h′i ≤ yi holds; therefore, vectors
h and h′ satisfy the necessary conditions.
To sum up, for any solution of the defined problemwhich we denote by vectorsh andh′ there is a strategy
of the opponent with payoff c ·h+ c′ ·h′. Also, for any (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy of player 2, there are two
vectors h and h′ that satisfy the necessary conditions of the problem and min(w · h,w · h′) = u holds for
them. Therefore, this formulation is indeed a valid formulation of the best response problem. From now on,
we may use these two formulations interchangeably.
6.2.1 A 1/3-Approximation
Any strategy of the player 2 against a 2-strategy of the first player can be represented by two vectors h and
h′. If we relax the integrality constraint of the elements in these vectors, they can be fractional numbers
between 0 and 1. We call such a strategy a fractional strategy. In this section, we give an algorithm to find
the best fractional strategy of the opponent. Using this algorithm we give an exact definition of the greedy
opponent. Also, using some properties of the algorithm we prove that player 1 achieves a (u/3, p)-maximin
strategy by finding his best strategy against the greedy opponent.
Given s = (x,x′) a 2-strategy of the first player, vectorsh andh′ are a valid representation of a fractional
response y iff:
1. For any i ∈ [k], hi and h′i are real numbers between 0 and 1.
2. If xi ≤ x′i, then h′i ≤ hi holds. Otherwise, hi ≤ h′i holds.
3. Also, c · h+ c′ · h′ ≤ m.
The utility that this strategy gets against x and x′ is respectively u2(x, y) = w ·h and u2(x′, y) = w ·h′.
Let (h, h′) be such a strategy. We call an element hi (or h′i) an available element if it is possible to increase
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hi by a nonzero amount without changing h′i. Formally element hi is available iff the following conditions
hold: hi < 1 and if x′i ≤ xi, then hi ≤ h′i holds. We also call hi and h′i jointly available iff hi < 1 and
h′i < 1. In the other words, it is possible to increase both of them by a nonzero amount without violating the
necessary conditions on h and h′. Let c and c′ be the cost vectors of a 2-strategy of the first player denoted
by s. We define two ratio vectors of length k for this strategy and denote them by r and r′. For any battlefield
i ∈ [k], we set ri = ciwi and r′i =
c′i
wi
. Note that spending  amount of troop on an available element, hi,
increases it by /ci and increases u2(x, y) by /ri. Roughly speaking, elements with smaller ratios are more
valuable.
Given a 2-strategy of the first player in an instance of the Colonel Blotto, Algorithm 3 find a best fractional
response of the second player. This algorithm consists of several iterations. At the beginning, all the elements
of vectors h and h′ are 0. In each iteration, the algorithm chooses two elements hi and h′j where they are
independently or jointly available and they minimize ri+r′j . Then, it increases each one by a nonzero amount
such that h · w and h′ · w increase equally. Note that to increase these elements the algorithm spends an
amount of troop that is determined by the cost vectors. This algorithm stops if there is no troop left or it is
not possible to increase the elements. Note that the output of this algorithm satisfies equation h ·w = h′ ·w.
In the other words, the strategy that this algorithm finds gets the same amount of utility against strategies x
and x′. In Lemma 6.13, we prove that any best fractional response of the second player has this property.
Also, we prove in Lemma 6.14 that this algorithm indeed finds a best fractional response.
Algorithm 3 Best fractional strategy of the second player.
Input: strategies x and x′ of the first player and vector w which is the battlefields’ weight vector.
Output: two vectors h and h′ which denote a fractional strategy of player 2.
1: Let c, c′ denote cost vectors of x and x′.
2: h,h′ ← (0, . . . , 0)
3: whilem′ > 0 do
4: B1 ← {i : i ∈ [k], hi is available} and a← arg mini∈B1 ri
5: B′1 ← {i : i ∈ [k], h′i is available} and b← arg mini∈B′1 r′i
6: B2 ← {i : i ∈ [k], hi and h′i are jointly available} and d← arg mini∈B2 ri + r′i
. In the case of tie, pick the smaller index
7: if ra + r′b < rd + r′d then
8: Maximize t+ t′ subject to the following conditions:
• After increasing ha by t and h′b by t′, vectors h and h′ are valid.
• t · wa = t′ · wb
• t · ca + t′ · c′b ≤ m′
9: Increase ha by t and h′b by t′.
10: m′ ← m′ − (t · ca + t′ · c′b)
11: else
12: Maximize t subject to the following conditions:
• After increasing hd and h′d by t, vectors h and h′ are valid.
• t · (cd + c′d) ≤ m′
13: Increase both hd and h′d by t.
14: m′ ← t · (cd + c′d)
15: end if
16: end while
17: return h,h′
Lemma 6.13. If vectors h and h′ represent a best fractional strategy of the player 2 against an arbitrary
32
2-strategy of the first player, then w · h = w · h′ holds.
Proof. Let y be a best fractional strategy of the second player represented by h and h′ wherew ·h 6= w ·h′.
Without loss of generality, assumew ·h > w ·h′. We show that it is possible to increase min(w ·h,w ·h′)
by modifying y. Since w · h > w · h′ holds, there exists a battlefield i ∈ [k] where hi > h′i. We can
decrease hi by a nonzero amount and increase h′i using the extra amount of troop achieved from that. This
modification of hi and h′i increases min(w · h,w · h′) by a nonzero amount which is a contradiction with
the assumption that y is a best fractional strategy.
Lemma 6.14. Algorithm 3 gives a best fractional response of the second player.
Proof. Let strategy y denote the output of Algorithm 3. Assume y is not a best response of the second
player and let strategy y′ represented by a pair of vectors η and η′ be a best response of player 2 against
the 2-strategy (x, x′). Let t denote the first iteration of the algorithm after which there exists at least a
battlefield i ∈ [k] where ηi < hi or η′i < h′i (Vectors h and h′ are defined in Algorithm 3.) Let i and j
denote the battlefields where hi and h′j are increased in the t-th iteration of the algorithm. (It is possible
that j = i.) Assume that among all the best strategies of the second player y′ is the strategy that minimizes
t. Also among all those with minimum t, y′ is the one that minimizes (hi − ηi) + (h′j − η′j). We show
that given such a strategy we can modify it in a way that t or (hi − ηi) + (h′i − η′i) decreases which is a
contradiction. Note that u2(x,y) = u2(x′,y) holds since each iteration of the Algorithm 3 increases them by
the same amount. Therefore, strategy y′ should perform better than y against both x and x′. More formally,
u2(x,y) < u2(x,y
′) and u2(x′,y) < u2(x′,y′) hold. There are two possible cases for the relation between
h and h′ after iteration t. In both cases we prove that it is possible to modify y′ and lower (hi−ηi)+(h′i−η′i)
or t while it is still a best strategy of the second player.
Case 1: Both hi > ηi and h′j > η′j hold. In this case, strategy y achieves more utility against x in battlefield i
and against x′ in battlefield j than strategy y′ does. Therefore, strategy y′ compensates this by putting more
troops in other battlefields. If there is a battlefield i′ ∈ [k], where hi′ < ηi′ and h′i′ < η′i′ then it is possible
to modify strategy y′ by decreasing ηi′ and η′i′ by a nonzero amount and increasing ηi and η
′
j such that the
amount of troops used by strategy y′ does not increase and its utility does not decrease. It is possible since
Algorithm 3 in each iteration, among all the available elements chooses a pair that spending a unit of troop
in them gives us the maximum amount of utility, and elements hi′ and h′i′ are both available at this iteration.
If this does not hold then there are two battlefields i′, j′ ∈ [k] where hi′ < ηi′ and h′j′ < η′j′ . In this case, the
only difference is that we need to make sure that both hi′ and h′j′ are available at this iteration which can be
inferred from the fact that for both i′ and j′, equations h′i′ ≥ η′i′ and hj′ ≥ ηj′ hold.
Case 2: Exactly one of hi > ηi and h′j > η′j holds. Without loss of generality, we assume hi > ηi holds.
Note that by Lemma 6.13 the amount of utility that strategy y′ gets against strategies x and x′ is equal. Also,
since hi > ηi and h′j ≤ η′j hold, there exists a battlefield i′ ∈ [k] where ηi′ − hi′ > η′i′ − h′i′ . This means
that hi′ is available at iteration t. However, in each iteration, Algorithm 3, chooses a pair of elements in h
and h′ where the amount of utility achieved per spending a unit of troop in their combination is maximized.
This yields that it is possible to modify y′ by decreasing ηi′ and increasing ηi in a way that η′ and η are still
a valid representation of strategy y′ and u2(y,x) is not decreased.
In both cases we proved that it is possible to modify strategy y such that either t decreases by 1 or
(hi − ηi) + (h′j − η′j) decreases while t is not changed, which is a contradiction with the assumptions that
we had on strategy y′. Thus, strategy y the output of Algorithm 3 is indeed the best fractional response of
the second player
To give a 2-approximation of the first player’s best 2-strategy, we first define the greedy opponent. The
exact definition is given in Definition 6.15. His response is to find a fractional response using Algorithm
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3 and round it down to an integral one. In Observation 6.16 we prove that the greedy opponent’s response
differs from the fractional response in at most two battlefields. Note that if wmax > u/3 holds, the first player
simply achieves (u/3, p)-maximin 2-strategy by putting all his troops on the battlefield with wight wmax.
For the simplicity throughout the paper we assume wmax ≤ u/3 holds. This yields that the best 2-strategy
of the first player against such an opponent is a (u/3, p)-maximin 2-strategy. Thus, in the rest of this section
we focus on finding the best strategy of player 1 against the greedy opponent.
Definition 6.15 (GreedyOpponent). Greedy opponent is a weaker version of the second player. The response
of this opponent against a 2-strategy of the first player, s = (x,x′), is as follows. Using Algorithm 3, he first
finds a best fractional response of the second player against s , which is denoted by vectors h and h′. Since
it is a fractional response some of the elements in these vectors are fractional. The greedy opponent rounds
down the elements of these vectors and plays according to the rounded vectors.
Observation 6.16. Let strategy s be the fractional response of player 2 against a given 2-strategy of the first
player that is obtained from Algorithm 3. Also, let s′ denote the response of the greedy opponent against the
same strategy of the first player. Strategies s and s′ put different amount of troops in at most two battlefields.
Proof. We prove in Lemma 6.17 that there are at most two battlefields i, j ∈ [k] where hi, hj , h′i or h′j are
fractional. Since the greedy opponent rounds down these vectors, his strategy differs from the fractional
strategy in at most two battlefields.
In the following lemma we present three import properties of Algorithm 3 which we use later to prove
the main theorem of this section.
Lemma 6.17. Consider a, b and c that are defined in lines 4, 5 and 6 of Algorithm 3.
1. At the beginning of each iteration of Algorithm 3, any fractional element ofh andh′ is in {ha, h′b, hc, h′c}.
2. Also, at the beginning of each iteration at most one of ha, h′b, hc or h′c is fractional.
3. After the last iteration of the algorithm there are at most two indices i, j ∈ [k] where hi, hj , h′i or hj
is fractional.
Proof. We first prove that at the beginning of the algorithm, all the elements of h and h′ other than ha, h′b, hc,
and h′c are integral. Let r, r′ respectively denote the minimum ratios among the available elements of vectors
h and h′ in an arbitrary iteration of the algorithm. It is easy to see that neither r nor r′ decreases throughout
the algorithm. Thus, any element that is increased before this iteration is either unavailable or is in {ha, h′b, hc,
h′c}. Also note that any element that has value less than 1 is either available or jointly available. Therefore,
any element that is not in {ha, h′b, hc, h′c} is equal to either 0 or 1.
Moreover, we show that at the beginning of each iteration of Algorithm 3, at most one of ha, h′b, hc and
h′c is fractional. We use proof by induction. We prove that if it is not the last iteration of the algorithm, and
at the beginning of that at most one element in {ha, h′b, hc, h′c} is fractional, after this iteration the same
holds. It suffices since we know that any fractional element is in {ha, h′b, hc, h′c}. Note that since at most
one element in both vectors is fractional this fractional element is independently available. Therefore, it is
either ha or h′b. If ra + r′b ≤ rc + rc then the algorithm increases ha and h′b until one of them is not available
anymore (note that it is not the last iteration) which means it is equal to 1. Otherwise, the algorithm increases
both hc and h′c by the same amount until one of them becomes equal to 1. Therefore, in both cases at most
one element remains fractional.
Now, consider the last iteration of the algorithm. We proved that at the beginning, at most one element in
{ha, h′b, hc, h′c} is fractional. Also, the fractional element is either ha or h′b. If at this iteration, the algorithm
changes ha and h′b, then these are the only ones that can be fractional. Also, if the algorithm changes hc and
h′c, then only hc, h′c and one of ha or h′b can be fractional. In both cases there are at most two battlefields i
and j where hi, hj , h′i or h′j are fractional.
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For any 2-strategy of the first player we define a signature which is determined by Algorithm 3 and the
state in which this algorithm terminates.
Definition 6.18 (Signature of a 2-strategy). For any strategy s = (x,x′) find the best fractional response of
the algorithm using Algorithm 3 and denote it by vectors h and h′. consider sets B1, B′1, and B2 in the last
iteration of the algorithm. Define
• a := arg mini∈B1 ri,
• b := arg mini∈B′1 r
′
i, and
• c := arg mini∈B2 ri + r
′
i.
Also, let µ be the total number of troops that are spent on ha, h′b, hc and h′c. For instance, if a, b and c are
three different battlefields, µ := ca · ha + c′b · h′b + cc · hc + c′c · h′c. Moreover, denote by u˙1 and u˙2 the utility
that the greedy opponent achieves against strategies x and x′ in these battlefields. We define the signature
of strategy s to be (a, b, c, µ, xa,b,c, x′a,b,c, u˙1, u˙2) and we denote it by σs. Note that we represent (xa, xb, xc)
by xa,b,c.
Lemma 6.19. Let σ be the signature of the greedy opponent’s response against a 2-strategy of the first
player (x,x′). There exists a function that determines the response of the greedy opponent in any battlefield
i ∈ [k]− {a, b, c} given xi, x′i and σ.
Proof. Let σ be (a, b, c, µ, xa,b,c, x′a,b,c, u˙1, u˙2). Also without loss of generality, we assume that xi ≤ x′i:
therefore, ci = xi and c′i = x′i−xi hold. We claim that Algorithm 4 finds hi and h′i given xi, x′i, and signature
σ. To prove that this algorithm is correct, we need to show that if hi or hj is set to 1 by this algorithm, any
greedy response to a strategy with this signature also sets this to 1. We also need to prove that any element
that is set to 0 is also 0 any greedy response to a strategy with this signature.
Note that the minimum ratio of the available (or jointly available) elements does not decrease after each
iteration. Also, note that in Algorithm 3, the tie breaking rule while finding the available element with the
minimum ratio is the index of elements. Thus, the definition of the signature directly results that any element
that is set to 1 by this algorithm is indeed correct. We just need to show the second part. By Algorithm 3,
for battlefield i, if ri + r′i > rc + r′c holds or ri + r′i = rc + r′c and i > c hold, h′i = 0. Also, if in addition to
the mentioned condition, ri > ra holds and ri = ra and i > a hold then, hi = 0. The only remaining case is
when ri < ra and r′i ≥ r′b holds. In this case the algorithm sets h′i = 0 even if ri + r′i ≤ rc + r′c. We prove
by contradiction that h′i = 0 is correct in this situation. Assume that there exists a response in which h′i = 1.
Let γ and γ′ respectively denote the minimum ratios among the ratio of available elements in vectors h and
h′ at the iteration that h′i first changes. The only way that h′i changes is as a jointly available element. For
this to be possible, conditions ri + r′i ≤ γ + γ′ and ri + γ′ > γ + γ′ must hold. This is a contradiction
with the fact that minimum ratio of the available elements does not decrease throughout the algorithm. Thus,
Algorithm 4 correctly finds the best response of the greedy opponent in battlefield i.
Lemma 6.20. Let S be the set of 2-strategies of the first player in an instance of Discrete Colonel Blotto and
let σS denote the set of signatures of the strategies in S. Size of the set σS is polynomial and there exists a
polynomial time algorithm to find it.
Proof. Let (a, b, c, µ, xa,b,c, x′a,b,c, u˙1, u˙2) denote the signature of an arbitrary 2-strategy s = (x,x′). Note
that all possible values of a, b, c, xa,b,c andx′a,b,c is bounded by a polynomial inn and k. Also, by Lemma 6.17,
the amounts of troop that the second player spends in the rest of the battlefields is integral. Therefore, µ is
polynomial in m. Thus, we just need to prove that given an assignment to these variables there are poly-
nomially many possible cases for values of u˙1 and u˙2. Let u1 and u2 denote the amount of troops that the
the greedy opponent gets in the other k − 3 battlefields. By Lemma 6.13, in a valid response of this oppo-
nent, u1 + u˙1 = u˙2 + u2 holds. Since u1 − u2 has polynomially many possible values, the same holds for
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Algorithm 4Greedy opponent’s response in battlefield i given xi, x′i and σ = (a, b, c, µ, xa,b,c, x′a,b,c, u˙1, u˙2)
Without loss of generality, this algorithm assumes that xi ≤ x′i. Also ri and r′i are i-th elements of ratio
vectors that can be computed using xi, x′i and wi.
1: hi, h′i ← 0
2: if ri < ra or (ri = ra, i < a) then
3: hi ← 1
4: if r′i < r′b or (r′i = r′b, i < b) then
5: h′i ← 1
6: end if
7: else if ri + r′i < rc + r′c or (ri + r′i = rc + r′c, i < c) then
8: hi, h′i ← 1
9: end if
10: return hi and h′i
u˙1 − u˙2. We claim that there is a polynomial time algorithm that finds u˙1 and u˙2 given value of u˙1 − u˙2.
By Lemma 6.17, before the last iteration of Algorithm 3, at most one of ha, h′b, hc and h′c is fractional and
all the other elements are integral. We also mention in the proof that this fractional one is either ha or h′b.
This element is responsible for the difference between u˙1 and u˙2; therefore, the value of that is uniquely
determined given u˙1 − u˙2. After fixing the value of this fractional element, we find the exact values of u˙1
and u˙2 by simulating the last iteration of the algorithm.
Theorem 6.21. Given that there exists a (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy of the first player, there is an algorithm
that finds a (u/3, p)-maximin 2-strategy of this player in polynomial time.
Proof. By Observation 6.16, the strategy of the greedy opponent differs from the fractional best response
in at most two battlefields. Also, the best integral strategy gets utility at most equal to the fractional one.
Therefore, this weaker opponent loses at most 2 · wmax compared to his best response strategy. Note that
if losing at most 2 · wmax does not guarantee a (u/3, p)-maximin 2-strategy for player 1, he can put all his
troops in the battlefield with the maximum weight and just win that one. This yields that the best strategy of
the first player against the greedy opponent guarantees a (u/3, p)-maximin 2-strategy for him.
The problem that we need to solve now is how to find the best strategy of player 1 against the greedy
opponent. We cannot afford to go over all the possible strategies and search for the best one. However,
playing against the greedy opponent gives us the ability to narrow down our search space and find the best
response by solving polynomially many dynamic programs. For any signature σ, let Sσ denote the set of all
the first player’s strategies with signature σ. To find the best strategy of player 1 against the greedy opponent,
we just need to exhaustively searches through all the possible signatures and for any σ find the best strategy
of player 1 in set Sσ . Note that by Lemma 6.20 there are polynomially many valid signatures. We give a
dynamic program that given a signature σ = (a, b, c, µ, xa,b,c, x′a,b,c, u˙1, u˙2), finds the best strategy in set
Sσ . By Lemma 6.19, there exists a function that determines the response of the greedy opponent in any
battlefield i given xi, x′i, and σ. Let f(i, xi, x′i, σ) denote this function. The dynamic program that we
use is D(j, n1, n2, ω, u1, u2) with j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 3}, n1, n2 ∈ {0, , . . . , n}, ω ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − µ} and
u1, u2 ∈ {0, . . . ,
∑
iwi}. Note that j is in set {0, . . . , k − 3} since before the dynamic program we remove
three battlefields a, b and c. The value of D(j, n1, n2, ω, u1, u2) is either 0 or 1. It is 1 iff it is possible to
give two partial strategies x = (x1, . . . , xj) and x′ = (x′1, . . . , x′j) over the first j battlefields such that all
the following conditions are satisfied. Let h and h′ denote the partial response of the greedy opponent to
2-strategy (x,x′) where for any i, hi and h′i are determined by f(i, xi, x′i, σ).
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• Condition 1: Σi∈[j]xi = n1 and Σi∈[j]x′i = n2. This is a condition on the amount of troops that the
first player uses in the first j battlefields.
• Condition 2: w · h = u1 and w · h′ = u2. This condition guarantees that the utility that the greedy
opponent gets against strategies x and x′ in the first j battlefield is respectively u1 and u2.
• Condition 3: c · h + c′ · h′ = ω, where c′ and c are partial cost vectors of x and x′. This condition
guarantees that the greedy opponent uses ω troops in the first j battlefields.
Base case. We start with the case where j = 0. Here, clearly, D(0, n1, n2, ω, u1, u2) = 1 iff n1, n2, ω, u1
and u2 are all 0.
Updating the DP. To update D(j, n1, n2, ω, u1, u2), we only have to decide on how many troops to put on
the j-th battlefield in strategies x and x′. We try all the possibilities for values of variables xj and x′j and
check, recursively, whether any of these choices satisfies the requirements for the dynamic value to be 1.
Let ξ and ξ′ denote an assignment to xj and x′j . Also, let ω′ denote the amount of troops that the greedy
opponent puts in battlefield j if xj = ξ and x′j = ξ′. Moreover, u′1 and u′2 respectively denote the utility that
he gets against strategies x and x′ in this battlefield. Note that u′1, u′2 and ω′ can be achieved using function
f . D(j, n1, n2, ω, u1, u2) = 1 iff there exist at least a pair of ξ ∈ {0, . . . , n1} and ξ′ ∈ {0, . . . , n2} where
D(j − 1, n1 − ξ, n2 − ξ′, ω − ω′, u1 − u′1, u2 − u′2) = 1.
After finding the value of D for all the valid inputs, we need to identify the strategies that are in set Sσ
to be able to find the best one. Roughly speaking, one may think that to find the best strategy of player 1 in
set Sσ , it is enough if using the dynamic data we find the strategy that minimizes the utility that the greedy
opponent gets in k− 3 remaining battlefields. However, it is not true since using this method we may end up
finding a strategy that is apparently very good for the first player but does not have the same signature as σ.
This may happen since in the dynamic we do not consider the fact that the greedy opponent finds a strategy
in which he gets the same utility against both strategies x and x′. To avoid that, before finding the best
strategy using the dynamic data we need to filter out the strategies that are not in Sσ . Recall that signature σ
is (a, b, c, µ, xa,b,c, x′a,b,c, u˙1, u˙2). For any pair of u1 and u2 that D(k − 3, n1, n2,m− µ, u1, u2) = 1 there
exists a 2-strategy s ∈ Sσ against which the greedy opponent gets utility u1 + u˙1 iff u1 + u˙1 = u2 + u˙2
since any response of the greedy opponent to a 2-strategy s = (x,x′) achieves the same utility against both
strategies x and x′. Therefore, to find the best 2-strategy in Sσ , using the dynamic data we find a pair of u1
and u2 such that D(j, n1, n2, ω, u1, u2) = 1 and u1 + u˙1 = u2 + u˙2 subject to minimizing u1 + u˙1. This
means that there exists a 2-strategy s of the first player against which the greedy opponent achieves u1 + u˙1
utility.
By Lemma 6.20, there are polynomially many different valid signatures and there is a polynomial time
algorithm to find them. Therefore, one can find the best strategy of the first player against the greedy opponent
by going over all the possible signatures and finding the best 2-strategy using the described dynamic program.
Note that having a best strategy against the greedy opponent gives a (u/3, p)-maximin 2-strategy of player 1.
6.2.2 A (1− )-Approximation
In Section 6.1 we give a (1 − )-Approximation for the case of one pure strategy. Here, we use the same
idea and adapt it for our purpose. Recall that, we first define an updated wight vector by rounding down the
weight of battlefields to a power of (1+). Then, we partition them to two sets of heavy and light battlefields
with threshold τ = u/4. Corollary 6.2 implies that finding a ((1− /2)u, 1)-maximin 2-strategy after this
modification gives us a ((1− )u, 1)-maximin 2-strategy. Therefore, we only focus on the instance with the
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updated weights. The overall idea is to first define a weaker opponent such that finding the best strategy of
the first player against him gives us a ((1 − /2)u, 1)-maximin 2-strategy. Then, give a polynomial time
algorithm that finds this best strategy. The weaker adversary in the previous section is an opponent whose
response against a strategy of the first player is to go over all his pure strategies on the heavy battlefields and
for each one, play greedily on the light battlefields. The weaker adversary that we define against 2-strategies
is almost similar to the one in the previous section. The only difference is on the greedy algorithm that he
uses on the light battlefields which is to respond as a greedy opponent (with a minor technical modification
that we explain later). Note that the greedy opponent loses at most 2 · wmax compared to his best response;
thus, playing against this weaker opponent gives a ((1− /2)u, 1)-maximin 2-strategy of the first player.
To be able to provide a best response algorithm, we first give a new representations for the strategies
of both players on heavy battlefields so that we can give proper limits on the number of strategies that they
have. By Observation 6.3, the number of distinct heavy battlefields in bounded by a constant. For the case
of 1-strategies, we represent first player’s strategies by the number of troops that he puts on each battlefield
weight. However, the exact same representation does not work for 2-strategies of the first player, but we are
still able to represent them by vectors of polynomial length such that the number of valid representations is
polynomial as well. Note that given a 2-strategy s = (x,x′) of the first player, for each battlefield i ∈ [k],
either xi ≤ x′i or xi > x′i holds. Based on this we partition the battlefields to two types. A battlefield i is of
type 1 if xi ≤ x′i otherwise it is of type 2. Lemma 6.22 proves that there is an optimal 2-strategy s = (x,x′)
of the first player where both strategies x and x′ put roughly the same number of troops in battlefields of the
same type and the same weight.
Lemma 6.22. If player 1 has a (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy , he also has a (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy s =
(x,x′) where for any two battlefields i and j that conditions wi = wj , i ≤ j, and xi ≤ x′i hold we have
0 ≤ xi − xj ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ x′i − x′j ≤ 1.
Proof. Let s = (x,x′) be a (u, P )-maximin 2-strategy of player 1. Assume battlefields i and j, where i < j,
are of the same type and the same weight, but conditions |xi − xj | ≤ 1 and |x′i − x′j | ≤ 1 do not hold for
them. Let t = xi + xj and t′ = x′i + x′j respectively denote the amount of troops that strategies x′ and
x′ put on these battlefields. There are five possible cases for the utility that the second player gets in these
battlefields. We show that it is possible to redistribute t and t′ on battlefields i and j to satisfy the mentioned
conditions without lowering the number of troops that the opponents needs to spend in each case. Let u and
u′ respectively denote the utility that the second player gets against strategies x and x′ in these battlefields.
All the possible cases for value of u and u′ are as follows.
1. Case 1: u = w and u′ = w. The second player achives this by spending min(x′i, x′j) troops which is
maximized when x′i = dt′/2e, x′j = bt′/2c.
2. Case 2: u = 2w and u′ = w. The opponent spends min(x′i + xj , x′j + xi) troops to get this utility.
This is maximized when x′i = dt′/2e, x′j = bt′/2c, xi = dt/2e and xj = bt/2c.
3. Case 3: (u = 0 and u′ = 0), (u = w and u′ = w) or (u = 2w and u′ = 2w). These cases are
independent of the distribution. The opponent spends respectively 0, t and t + t′ troops to achieve
theses results.
Therefore, if a given strategy does not satisfy the desired conditions, we modify it by setting x′i = dt′/2e,
x′j = bt′/2c, xi = dt/2e and xj = bt/2c. As we showed, after this modification there is no possible amount
of utility that the second player can get with spending fewer number of troops in battlefields i and j. Also
this modifidied strategy satisfies 0 ≤ xi − xj ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ x′i − x′j ≤ 1.
We represent any partial 2-strategy of the first player on the heavy battlefields by a vector of length
poly (1/). Each entry of this vector is associated with a heavy weight. The i-th entry consists of a tuple
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which determines how many battlefields of the i-th heavy weight are from type 1, and how many troops each
of x and x′ spend on the battlefields of each type with this weight. Let us denote by Sh1 the set of all such
vectors. Note that each entry of a vector in this representation has polynomially many possible values. The
following is a corollary of this fact.
Corollary 6.23. |Sh1 | ≤ npoly(1/) where Sh1 is the set of 2-strategies of the first player on the heavy battle-
fields.
Also, using the same argument as we had for the case of 1-strategies, one can see that, here as well, it
is possible to represent pure strategies of the second player on heavy battlefields by vectors of constant size.
Let Sh2 denote the set of all such vectors. It is easy to see that bservation 6.3 holds for this case as well, and
|Sh2 | is bounded by a constant.
As we mentioned, the weaker adversary acts as a greedy opponent on the light battlefields; therefore, he
uses Algorithm 3 to find a best fractional response on these battlefields. However, there is a technical detail
that we should consider here. Let s = (x,x′) denote the strategy of player 1 and let y be a partial response of
the weaker adversary on heavy battlefields. By Lemma 6.13 any best fractional response gets the same utility
against both the strategies of the first player. Note that it is possible that u2(x,y) = u2(x′,y) does not hold.
Thus, the amount of utility that a best fractional response gets against x and x′ on the light battlefields differs
by u2(x,y)− u2(x′,y). Here, the issue is that in Algorithm 3 we assume that at the beginning the amounts
of utility that the greedy opponent has against strategies x and x′ are both equal to 0. Therefore, at each
iteration the algorithm increases them by the same amount. Hence, the same algorithm cannot be used here,
but with a slight modification we can use it for the case of u2(x,y) 6= u2(x′,y) as well. Denote by u and u′
the amount of utility that the fractional response gets against strategies x and x′ until an arbitrary iteration
of Algorithm 3. If we use it to complete the partial strategy y on the light battlefields, at the beginning
u = u2(x,y) and u′ = u2(x′,y). Without loss of generality, assume u′ ≤ u. The modification is as follows.
Since we want u and u′ to be equal at the end, before we start increasing both of them, we greedily increase
the available elements of vector h (to increases u) until u = u′ holds. This is a correct approach since in a
best fractional response the overall weight of the light battlefields in which hi > h′i is at least u− u′. Also,
any such battlefield is available at the beginning of Algorithm 3. One can easily verify that this modification
does not affect the properties that we have proved for the greedy opponent’s response.
Also, recall that signature of any 2-strategies of the first player, defined in Definition 6.18, is unique
since the response of the greedy opponent against a 2-strategy is unique as well. However, the signature of
a 2-strategy on the light battlefields also depends on the strategy of the opponent on the heavy battlefields.
Roughly speaking, a 2-strategy of the first player s = (x,x′), for any yh ∈ Sh2 faces a different type of
greedy opponent on the light battlefields since the remaining amount of troops and u2(x,yh) − u2(x′,yh)
changes the strategy of the greedy opponent on the light battlefields. Therefore, in the definition of signature
of a 2-strategy on the light battlefields we should also include the type of the opponent which is determined
by a strategy of the second player on the heavy battlefields. Given any such strategy, yh, we denote signature
of 2-strategy s by σ(s,yh). Now, we are ready to prove the main theorem of this section which is as follows.
Theorem 6.12 (restated). Given that player 1 has a (u, p)-maximin 2-strategy, there exists a polynomial
time algorithm that obtains a ((1− )u, p)-maximin 2-strategy of player 1 for any arbitrarily small constant
 > 0.
Proof. Let sh = (x,x′) ∈ Sh1 be a 2-strategy of the first player on heavy battlefields and let S(sh) denote
the set of all the 2-strategies of the first player that plays strategy sh on heavy battlefields. We find a partial
2-strategy on the light battlefields sl such that the combination of these 2-strategies, denoted by s = (sh, sl),
loses at most u/2 compared to the best strategy in S(sh). For any i ∈ |Sh2 |, strategy yhi denotes the i-
th strategy in Sh2 . For any i ∈ |Sh2 |, we fix a signature σi and find a 2-strategy sl such that for any i,
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σ((sh, sl),yhi ) = σi is satisfied. Also, among all such strategies, we pick the one that minimizes the utility
of the weaker adversary against (sh, sl). Recall that to find a best strategy of the first player against a single
greedy opponent we design a dynamic program in the proof of Theorem 6.21. The main difference here is
that we want a strategy that is the best against multiple greedy opponents; therefore, we need to run these
dynamic programs in parallel and update them simultaneously. For that, we use an idea that is presented in
the previous section. In Section 6.1, we design a dynamic program that finds the best strategy of the first
player against multiple weaker adversaries at the same time. Combining this idea with the dynamic program
presented in the proof of Theorem 6.21 gives us a polynomial time algorithm to find a best strategy of the
first player against the weaker adversary.
Note that |Sh2 | is bounded by a constant and by Lemma 6.20 the number of possible signatures is polyno-
mial; thus, all the possible cases that we consider to find the best strategy of the first player against the weaker
adversary in S(sh) is polynomial as well. Also, size of the set Sh1 is polynomial. Hence, we can find the
best 2-strategy of the first player against the weaker adversary in polynomial time. As we mentioned such a
strategy is a ((1− )u, p)-maximin 2-strategy strategy of the first player.
6.3 Generalization to the Case of c-Strategies for c > 2
In this section the goal is to provide an algorithm that finds a ((1 − )u, p)-maximin c-strategy of the first
player given that the existence of a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy is guaranteed. The result of this section is
stated in the following theorem more formally.
Theorem 6.24. Given that there exists a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy of player 1, there is a polynomial time
algorithm that finds a ((1− )u, p)-maximin c-strategy of this player.
Note that in the case of (u, P )-maximin 2-strategy we show that in an optimal strategy the first player
plays both strategies with the same probability. It is easy to see that for the case of c > 2 this does not hold.
However, we show that to find an optimal strategy it suffice to just consider a constant set of probability
assignment to the strategies. By Theorem 4.2 given that a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy is guaranteed, there
exists an algorithm to construct a set Pc of O(1) profiles in time O(1). Recall that for a mixed strategy x, its
profile, denoted by ρ(x), is a multisite of probabilities associated to the pure strategies in the support of x.
Since |Pc| is bounded by a constant we can solve the problem for all profiles Pc and for each one find the best
strategy of player 1 that has this profile. In the rest of this section we assume that a probability assignment
to the strategies is given. Let s = (x1, . . .xc) be a c-strategy of the first player. For any i ∈ [c] denote by pi
the probability with which the first player plays strategy xi.
Similar to the case of ((1−)u, p)-maximin 2-strategy, we start by decomposing the battlefields to sets of
heavy and light battlefields. the threshold for that is τ = u/2c. We also round down the wights as mentioned
in the previous sections and just solve the problem for rounded wights. Then, we give proper limits on the
number of possible c-strategies of the first player and the strategies of the second player on heavy battlefields
to be able to design a polynomial time dynamic program that finds this a (1− )-approximate c-strategy. Let
s = (x1, . . . ,xc) be a c-strategy of the first player. We say two heavy battlefields i and j are from the same
type if wi = wj and there exists a permutation (a1, a2, . . . , ac) of numbers 1 to c where xa1i ≤ · · · ≤ xaci
and xa1j ≤ · · · ≤ xacj hold. We claim if a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy of the first player exists, there also exists
a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy in which the number of troops that the first player puts in the battlefields of the
same type in each strategy is almost the same. The formal claim is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.25. If player 1 has a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy, he also has a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy (x1, . . .xc)
where for any two battlefields of the same type i and j and any a ∈ [c] we have 0 ≤ xai − xaj ≤ 1.
Proof. Assume a best (u, p)-maximin c-strategy s is given that does not satisfy condition 0 ≤ xai−xaj ≤ 1 for
some a ∈ [c]. For any strategy xa, let ta denote the number of troops that this strategy spends in battlefields
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i and j. We modify s by redistributing these troops. For any a ∈ [c], set xaj = bta/2c and xai = dta/2e. We
prove that this modification does not lower the amount of troops that the opponent needs to spend in these
two battlefields to get any possible amounts of utility from strategies x1 . . .xc. Let w denote the weight of
battlefields i and j. Also we say a strategy xa is smaller than xb in these battlefields if a comes before b in the
given permutation (that defines their type). Utility of the second player in these battlefields has the following
form: there are two strategies xa and xb where xa < xb and the second player gets utilities 2 · w against
strategies smaller than or equal to xa and gets utility w against the ones that are between xa and xb. To get
this utility the second player spends min(xai + xbj , xaj + xbi) number of troops. One can easily verify that our
modification does not decrease this. Therefore, any given (u, p)-maximin c-strategy can be transformed to
a c-strategy that gets the same utility and satisfies the mentioned conditions.
Note that there are poly(1/) different weights of heavy battlefields. Also, the number of permutation
of numbers 1 to c is c!. Therefore, there are poly(1/) types of heavy battlefields. This means that we can
represent any c-strategy of the first player on the heavy battlefields by a vector of length poly(1/). Each
element of this vector, for any i ∈ [c], contains a variable that shows how many troops strategy xi puts in
battlefields of this type. Let Sh1 denote the set of all such partial c-strategies in this representation. Since the
total number of troops is n, each variable has n possible values. The following is a corollary of this.
Corollary 6.26. |Sh1 | ≤ npoly(1/).
When the goal of the first player is to achieve utility u with probability p, he loses if the second player
gets utility at least u with probability more than 1− p. We call a set of strategies in x1, . . . xc a losing set if
the sum of probability of the strategies in it is more than (1 − p). If the second player gets utility at least u
against all the strategies in at least one losing set, the first player loses in the sense that he can not get utility
u with probability p. Therefore, a c-strategy of the first player is a (u, p)-maximin c-strategy iff there does
not exist a pair of a losing set L and a pure strategy of the second player y where y gets utility at least u
against all the strategies in L. Let Lc be the set of all the losing sets. For any L ∈ Lc we define a new type
of opponent whose goal is to get utility at least u against all the pure strategies in set L and we denote it by
PL. Also, recall that to prevent player 1 from achieving a payoff of u, any opponent of type PL can only lose
in at most 2c/ heavy battlefields against any strategy in L. We represent any pure strategy of this opponent
by a vector of size poly(1/). Entries of this vector represent the number of battlefields of any type that
the second player wins against any strategy of the first player in set L. Therefore, each entry contains c · c!
numbers where each one is in [0, 2c/]. Let |Sh2 (L)| be the set of all partial pure strategies of the opponent
of type PL on heavy battlefields. We denote any pure strategy of the second player on heavy battlefields
by a pair of (L,y) where L determines the type of the opponent and y is his partial strategy on the heavy
battlefields. Let |Sh2 | denotes the set of all such pairs.
Corollary 6.27. |Sh2 | ≤ O(1).
Similar to the Section 6.1 and Section 6.2 we define a weaker adversary such that his best strategy loses
at most u/2c compared to the best strategy of the second player. We also design a dynamic program that
given a partial c-strategy of player 1 and a partial strategy of the weaker adversary on the heavy battlefields,
finds the best c-strategy of player 1 against this opponent on the light battlefields. Without loss of generality
we assume that the utility of the opponent is the minimum utility that he gets against all the strategies of the
first player. The reason is that we have different types of opponents and for each one we fix the strategies that
he is playing against. One can verify that combining these with the methods of the pervious sections gives
us an algorithm to find a ((1− )u, p)-maximin c-strategy of the first player.
Recall that in the case of 2-strategies, we had an alternative representation of the second player’s response
which is a pair of binary vectors of length k. We define a similar representation for the response of the second
player against c-strategies. Note that the main representation of his response is by a vector of length [k] in
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which the i-th entry is the number of troops that the second player puts in the i-th battlefield. An alternative
representation is to represent any response of player 2 against a c-strategy s = (x1, . . . ,xc) of player 1 by c
vectors of length k which we denote by (h1, . . . ,hc). For any i ∈ [c], vector hi determines the strategy of
player 2 against strategy xi. If hib = 1 holds for a battlefield b ∈ [k], the second player wins strategy xi in
this battlefield. Note that if for a pair of i, j ∈ [c], xib < xjb holds, then hjb = 1 yields hib = 1 which means
hjb ≤ hib. We also define c cost vectors (c1, . . . , cc) for the strategy of first player. These cost vectors, are to
transform strategies of player 2 between the two representations. For any battlefield b, let pib be a permutation
of numbers 1 to cwhere for any two consecutive elements i, j in that, xib ≤ xjb. We set cjb := xjb−xib. Roughly
speaking, assuming that the second player wins strategy xi in battlefield b, entry cjb is the number of troops
that he needs to add to this battlefield to win strategy xi as well. Also, for l := pib1 we set clb := xlb. A set of
vectors is a fractional solution to the best response problem iff:
1. For any pair of i, j ∈ [c], xib < xjb yields hjb ≤ hib.
2. Entries of the vectors are fractional numbers between 0 and 1.
3. The amount of troops used by the second player is at mostm. In the other words, Σi∈[c]ci · hi ≤ m.
Such a response is a best response iff mini∈[c]w · hi is maximized. We define the strategy of the weaker
adversary as follows: he searches through all his pure strategies on the heavy battlefields and for each one,
finds his best fractional response on the light battlefields. Then, he rounds down the fractional vectors and
plays according to the rounded vectors on the light battlefields. Note that any integral response gets utility
at most equal to the best fractional strategy. We prove that there exists a best fractional response that the
number of battlefields in which at least one of the vectors h1, . . . ,hc is fractional is at most c. Thus, the
weaker adversary loses at most u/2 compared to the best integral strategy of the second player.
Lemma 6.28. For any response of the second player y, let By denote the set of battlefields where for any
i ∈ By there exists at least one j ∈ [c] where hji is fractional. There exists a best fractional response of
player 2 for which |By| ≤ c.
Proof. Let y be a best fractional strategy with minimum |By|. For any i ∈ By define a vector vi. For any
j ∈ [c], entry vij := 1 if hij is fractional. Otherwise it is 0. By the optimality of the solution, all such vectors
are independent. Thus, the number of such vectors is bounded by the dimension which is c here.
Let s = (x1, . . . ,xc) be a strategy of player 1 and let y be the response of the weaker adversary to that.
We define the signature of s to be the set of c battlefields that have at least a fractional element in y and the
number of troops that each player puts in them. We claim that knowing the signature of a strategy and the
number of troops that different strategies of player 1 put in a given battlefield, one can uniquely determine
the strategy of player 2 in that battlefield. Define the ratio of a subset of strategies in s to be the minimum
amount of troops that one need to add to the fractional solution to increase the utility of the second player
against these strategies by a very small fixed amount denoted by δ. The overall idea is that given the signature
of a strategy, we can find these ratios for all the subsets and similar to what we do in Algorithm 4 for the case
of 2-strategies, these ratios and the index of the fractional battlefields are enough to determine the strategy
of player 2 in a given battlefield. Having this function and combining it with the ideas of the previous section
(the dynamic program designed in the proof of 6.21) gives us a dynamic program to find the best strategy of
player 1 against the weaker adversary.
7 Extension to Maximin Strategies
In this section, we show that our results carry over to the case where our goal is to maximize the guaranteed
expected utility. Recall that for the case of (u, p)-maximin strategies, we proved in Section 4 that regardless
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of the game structure, it suffices to only consider a constant number of probability assignments (profiles) to
the pure strategies. We used this to first fix the profile and then solve the game by finding the actual pure
strategies. Unfortunately, this is not the case when the objective is to maximize the expected utility. However,
we show that it is possible to consider only a polynomial number of profiles while ensuring that the found
solution among them is a (1− )-approximation of the actual maximin strategy.
Throughout this section we denote by OPT the guaranteed expected payoff of the optimal maximin
c-strategy. Our goal is to construct a c-strategy in polynomial time that guarantees an expected utility
of at least (1 − )OPT against any strategy of the opponent for any given constant  > 0. We call this a
(1− )-approximate maximin strategy. We start with the following claim.
Claim 7.1. Either OPT = 0 or OPT > 1/c.
Proof. Assume that OPT > 0. This means that there exists a set S of c pure strategies, where against any
strategy of player 2, at least one of the strategies in S obtains a non-zero utility. Since the battlefield weights
are integers, against any strategy of player 2, at least one strategy in S obtains a payoff of at least 1. Now, by
playing each of these strategies with probability 1/c, we guarantee an expected utility of at least 1/c against
any strategy of the opponent. Hence OPT > 1/c.
Let us denote by w :=
∑
i∈[k]wi the sum of all battlefield weights. Our next claim gives a lower bound
for the probabilities assigned to the strategies in the support.
Claim 7.2. For any given  > 0, there exists a (1 − )-approximate maximin strategy for any instance of
(continuous or discrete) Colonel Blotto where every strategy in the support is played with probability at least
OPT
cw .
Proof. Consider an optimal maximin strategy. If no strategy in its support is played with probability less than
OPT
cw , we are done. Otherwise, set the probability of all such strategies in the support to be 0 (i.e., remove
them from the support). Now consider a strategy of player 2. Each of the removed strategies gets a utility of
at most w against this strategy since w is sum of battlefield weights. On the other hand, there are at most c
such strategies. Therefore, the overall cost for the expected utility is
OPT
cw
· c · w = OPT. (18)
This implies that the remaining strategies in the support obtain an expected utility of at least (1 − )OPT
concluding the proof.
Assuming that OPT > 0 (otherwise a single pure strategy without any troops is the solution), by com-
bining the two claims above we get the following observation.
Observation 7.3. We can assume w.l.o.g., that the minimum probability is Ω(1/w).
We use this observation to consider onlyO(logw) probabilities for each strategy, leading to a polynomial
number of profiles that have to be considered.
Lemma 7.4. For any constant  > 0, and for any instance of continuous or discrete Colonel Blotto, there
are only polynomially many profiles among which an (1− )-approximate maximin is guaranteed to exist.
Proof. Suppose that the probabilities are all in set P = {p0, (1 + )p0, (1 + )2p0, . . . , 1} where p0 is the
lower bound for minimum probability. We showed in Observation 7.3 that it suffices to have p0 = Ω(1/w),
therefore |P | ≤ O(logw) since  is assumed to be constant. Note that O(logw) is polynomial in the input
size, thus, even if we tryO(logw) possibilities for c strategies, we have to try polynomiallymany possibilities.
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It remains to prove that P provides a (1− )-approximate maximin. Consider an optimal maximin strategy.
Round down the probability of each of its strategies to be in set P . Clearly, the updated probability of each
strategy is more than a (1−) fraction of its original probability. Therefore, against every strategy of player 2,
the updated strategy with probabilities in P obtains a payoff of at least (1−)OPT concluding the proof.
We use Lemma 7.4 to first fix the probabilities that are assigned to the strategies in the support and then
construct them. We further need to fix the value of OPT a priori. This can be done via a binary search so
long as by having probabilities p1, . . . , pc and the value of OPT, we have an oracle that decides whether it
is feasible to construct strategies x1, . . . ,xc that guarantee an expected payoff of at least (1 − )OPT with
these probabilities or not. Therefore it suffices for the continuous and discrete variants of Colonel Blotto to
provide this oracle. This is our goal in the next two sections.
7.1 Continuous Colonel Blotto
Given probabilities p1, . . . , pc and the optimal maximin value OPT, our goal in this section is to construct c
strategiesx1, . . . ,xc for the continuous variant of Colonel Blotto that guarantee a payoff of at least (1−)OPT
in expectation, against any strategy of player 2 (or report that this is infeasible). As in Section 5, we start by
formulating the original problem as a (non-linear) program.
find x1, . . . ,xc
subject to xji ≥ 0 ∀i, j : i ∈ [k], j ∈ [c]∑
i∈[k] x
j
i ≤ n ∀j ∈ [c]∑
j∈[c] pj · u1(xj ,y) ≥ OPT ∀y ∈ S2
(19)
We need to better understand the last constraint of the formulation above to be able to solve it in polynomial
time. For this, similar to the case of (u, p)-maximin strategies, we give an appropriately adapted definition
of critical tuples and combine it with configurations that were introduced in Section 5.2.
Definition 7.5 (Critical tuples). Consider a tupleW = (W1, . . . ,Wk) where eachWi is a subset of [c]. We
callW a critical tuple if and only if we have
∑
i,j:j∈Wi pjwi < OPT.
Recall from Section 5.2 that a configurationG is a vector of k matricesG1, . . . , Gk which we call partial
configurations, where for any i ∈ [k], and for any j1, j2 ∈ [c], the value of Gi(j1, j2) is ‘≤’ if xj1i ≤
xj2i and it is ‘≥’ otherwise. Furthermore, for configuration G and critical tuple W, define zi(G,W) :=
arg maxj:j 6∈Wi x
j
i . Note that it is crucial that zi(G,W) is solely a function ofG andW (and not the actual
strategies x1, . . . ,xc) so long as strategies x1, . . . ,xc comply withG.
find x1, . . . ,xc
subject to xji ≥ 0 ∀i, j : i ∈ [k], j ∈ [c]∑
i∈[k] x
j
i ≤ n ∀j ∈ [c]
ensure that x1, . . . ,xc comply withG∑
i∈[k] x
zi(G,W)
i > m for every critical tupleW = (W1, . . . ,Wk)
(20)
This is essentially the same LP as LP 13 of Section 5.2 except that we use a different notion of critical tuples.
Observation 7.6. Suppose that the configuration G of the optimal solution we seek to find is fixed. Then,
the last constraint of LP 20 is equivalent to the last constraint of Program 19.
Proof. Suppose at first that the last constraint of LP 20 is violated. We show that given that the solution
should comply withG, Program 19 is infeasible. To do so, consider the critical tupleW = (W1, . . . ,Wk)
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for which we have
∑
i∈[k] x
zi(G,W)
i ≤ m. Consider the strategy y of player 2 where yi = xzi(G,W)i . Clearly
this is a feasible strategy for player 2 since it requires only
∑
i∈[k] x
zi(G,W)
i troops which is assumed to be
no more than m. By Definition 7.5, the expected utility of any strategy of player 1 that complies withG is
less than OPT against y, meaning that Program 19 is infeasible.
Now suppose that LP 20 has a feasible solution x1, . . . ,xc. We show that this is also a valid solution
for Program 19. Assume for the sake of contradiction that this is not true. That is, player 2 has a strategy y
that prevents strategy x1, . . . ,xc to obtain an expected payoff of OPT. For any i ∈ [k], defineWi := {j :
xji > yi}. Since the expected utility of player 1 by playing this strategy is less than OPT against y, we have∑
i,j:j∈Wi pjwi < OPT. which means (W1, . . . ,Wk) is indeed a critical tuple. Consider the constraint of
LP 20 corresponding to this critical tuple, we need to have
∑
i∈[k] x
zi(G,W)
i ≤ m and therefore this constraint
must be violated; contradicting the fact that x1, . . . ,xc is a feasible solution of LP 20.
Lemma 7.7. LP 20 can be solved in polynomial time using the ellipsoid method.
Proof. We only need to give a separating oracle for the last constraint of LP 20 since there are only polyno-
mially many constraints of other types. Observation 7.6 shows that this constraint is essentially equivalent to
the best response of player 2 which is used in Program 19. That is, if we can solve the best response of player
2 in polynomial time, we will be able to check whether any constraint of LP 20 is violated. We show that in
fact, the best-response of player 2 can be solved in polynomial time. To do so, given c strategies x1, . . . ,xc
along with their probabilities p1, . . . , pc, we seek to find a strategy y of player 2 that maximizes his expected
utility. For this, one can use a simple knapsack-like dynamic programD(i,m′) which essentially represents
what expected payoff can be obtained from the first i battlefields given that player 2 uses only m′ troops
among them. One can easily confirm that this dynamic program can be updated by considering all possi-
bilities of the number of troops over the ith battlefield and recurse over the prior battlefields. This gives a
polynomial time algorithm for the best response of player 2, and therefore, a polynomial time algorithm for
the separating oracle of LP 20.
The lemma above shows that if we are given the actual configuration G, we can solve the problem in
polynomial time. In Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we showed how it suffices to only consider a polynomial number
of configurations when all battlefields have the same weight (i.e., the uniform variant of the game). The
same argument applies to the expected case since the players are still indifferent to the battlefields of the
same weight. The generalization to the case of different battlefield weights follows from essentially the
same approach described in Section 5.2. It suffices to consider the δ-uniform variant of the game for δ
being a relatively smaller error threshold than . Then on each bucket of battlefields of the same weight,
we only count the number of battlefields of each partial configuration instead of specifying the exact partial
configuration of each battlefield. Using similar techniques as in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, it can be shown that it
suffices to consider only a constant number of possibilities per bucket and therefore a polynomial number of
configurations in total. This concludes the continuous variant of the game when the objective is to compute
an approximate maximin strategy.
Theorem 7.8. For any  > 0, and any constant c, there exists a polynomial time algorithm to obtain a
(1− )-approximate maximin c-strategy for player 1 in the continuous Colonel Blotto game.
7.2 Discrete Colonel Blotto
In this section we solve the same problem solved above for the discrete variant of Colonel Blotto. That
is, given probabilities p1, . . . , pc and the optimal maximin value OPT, our goal is to construct c strategies
x1, . . . ,xc for the discrete variant of Colonel Blotto that guarantee a payoff of at least (1− )OPT in expec-
tation, against any strategy of player 2 (or report that this is infeasible).
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We show that a similar approach to that of Section 6, with minor changes, can be applied to this case.
Recall that the main idea that we used in Section 6 was to partition the battlefields into two disjoint subsets
of heavy and light battlefields. Then roughly speaking, the idea was to perform an exhaustive search over the
heavy battlefields and solve the problem over the light battlefields against a number of weaker adversaries
each corresponding to a response of player 2 over the heavy battlefields. Fix δ to be a relatively smaller error
threshold than . We say battlefield i is heavy if and only if wi ≥ δOPT. We first show that w.l.o.g. we
can assume that the number of heavy battlefields is at most O(1) or otherwise a simple strategy obtains an
expected utility of at least OPT.
Claim 7.9. If the number of heavy battlefields is more than 2c2/(δ), there exists an algorithm to find a
c-strategy minimax strategy providing a utility of at least OPT in polynomial time ifm < (1− )nc.
Proof. If the number of heavy battlefields is more than 2c2/(δ), partition them into c disjoint subsets of
size 2c/(δ). Consider the c-strategy of player 1 that chooses one of these subsets uniformly at random (i.e.,
with probability 1/c) and distributes his troops among its battlefields almost uniformly (i.e., with pairwise
difference of at most 1). Observe that even if in one of these strategies, player 1, wins c/δ heavy battlefields,
the expected utility that he gets would be more than OPT, since
1
c
· c
δ
· δOPT = OPT.
Therefore for player 2 to prevent player 1 from getting an expected utility of OPT, he has to win at least
(1−)c/δ battlefields of each strategy which is not feasible for him since he needs to havem ≥ (1−)nc.
Now, since we bound the number of heavy battlefields by a constant, we have our desired property that
the number of relevant responses of player 2 over the heavy battlefields is bounded by a constant.
Observation 7.10. Given a strategy of player 1 over the heavy battlefields, there exists a set Sh2 of a constant
number of responses of player 2 over heavy battlefields among which an optimal response is guaranteed to
exist.
Proof. We can assume that the number of troops that player 2 puts on the ith heavy battlefield is equal to
the number of troops that player 1 puts in this battlefield in one of his c pure strategies. Therefore on each
battlefield player 2 has c+ 1 options. Combined with the fact that the number of heavy battlefields is O(1),
this means there are only (c+ 1)O(1) ∈ O(1) relevant responses for player 2 over heavy battlefields.
The observation above implies that the techniques of Section 6.3 where we perform an exhaustive search
over the heavy battlefields and solve a dynamic programwith as many dimensions as the number of responses
of player 2 over the heavy battlefields is essentially feasible. It only remains to define the weaker adversary
over the light battlefields. This turns out to bemuch simpler than the case of finding a (u, p)-maximin strategy.
The weaker adversary. Given strategies x1, . . . ,xc with probabilities p1, . . . , pc, for any i ∈ [k] and any
j ∈ [c] define u(i, j) to be the expected payoff that player 2 gets by putting exactly xji troops in battlefield i.
Moreover, we define the ratio r(i, j) to be u(i, j)/xji . The first action of the weaker adversary is to choose
i ∈ [k], j ∈ [c] with maximum ratio r(i, j) and put exactly xji troops in battlefield i. Next, for any strategy
j′, we decrease xj
′
i by x
j
i . Intuitively, this updates the additional number of troops that the weaker adversary
has to put in this battlefield to win strategies with higher number of troops. Now over the updated strategies,
the weaker adversary again computes the ratios, picks the one with the higher value and update the strategies
accordingly. This continues until the weaker adversary spends all of hism troops.
Lemma 7.11. By optimizing against the weaker adversary’s greedy best response, one can guarantee an
expected payoff of OPT− wmax.
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The lemma above shows that if we optimize our strategy against the weaker adversary over the light
battlefields we obtain our desired (1− )OPT expected utility so long as we allow the adversary to play any
arbitrary strategy over the heavy battlefields. We capture the last iteration of algorithm above by signatures
similar to Definition 6.18 of Section 6.3. Then by fixing strategy of player 1 over the heavy battlefields, and
the signature of the weaker adversary for each of his constant relevant responses, we construct the optimal
strategy of player 1 over the light battlefields in polynomial time using a dynamic program as in Section 6.3.
Theorem 7.12. For any  > 0, and any constant c, there exists a polynomial time algorithm to obtain a
(1− )-approximate maximin c-strategy for player 1 in the discrete Colonel Blotto game if n ≥ (1 + )m/c.
Note that for the case where n < m/c, the second player can simply put max{x1i , . . . , xci} troops on
battlefield i, ensuring that we get expected utility 0.
8 Further Complexity Results
For the purpose of studying its complexity, let us define Colonel Blotto as the following computational
problem: Given a description of the discrete Colonel Blotto game — that is, the integer number of available
troops for both players, and integer weights for the k battlefields — what are the maxmin strategies of the
two players in the game whose utility is the probability of winning more than a threshold, say half, of the
total weight? Since the maxmin strategy is an exponential object, we only require the probability with which
the last strategy (a specific allocation) is played9. It is clear that this problem can be solved by the ellipsoid
algorithm in 2nO(1) (exponential) time, where n is the size of the input. We conjecture that the problem is
exponential time-complete.
We have been unable to prove this conjecture; but as a promising start and consolation prize, we can
show exponential time-completeness for the following generalization of the problem: In General Colonel
Blotto10 we are given a function u1 : S1 × S2 to the integers; that is, for each allocation of troops, u1
computes the utility of Player 1 (the utility of Player 2 is, as always, its negation). The function u1 is of
course given as a Boolean circuit, U , since its explicit form is exponential. Thus, the circuit U is the input
of the problem.
We can show the following:
Theorem 8.1. General Colonel Blotto is exponential time-complete.
Proof. We start with a problem we call Succinct Circuit Value: You are given a Boolean circuit with 2n
gates implicitly through another circuit C with n inputs. For each input i ∈ [2n], C outputs 2n + 3 bits
interpreted as a triple (t(i), j(i), k(i)), where t(i) ∈ {0, 1,∨,∧,¬} is the type of the gate, and j(i), k(i) < i
are the gates that are inputs of gate i. If t(i) ∈ {0, 1} then j(i) = k(i) = 0, and if t(i) = ¬, k(i) = 0. The
question asked is, does the output gate 2n − 1 evaluate to 1? It follows immediately from the techniques in
[23] that Succinct Circuit Value is exponential time-complete. Fo technical reasons, we require that not
all inputs are zero (say, t(0) = 1), a restriction that obviously maintains complexity.
We reduce this problem to another we call Succinct Linear Inequalities: We are given a circuit C
which, in input i, j gives the integer entry Aij of an M × N matrix A — j = N + 1 it returns the value
bi of an M -vector b. The question is, does the system Ax = b, x ≥ 0 have a solution? We claim that this
problem is also exponential time-complete, by a simple reduction from Succinct Circuit Value, emulating
the well known reduction between the non-succinct versions (see for example the textbook [8], page 222).
9It would be more natural to ask the value of the game; we require instead a component of the maxmin strategy for a technical
reason: in our reduction below for the generalized problem, computing the value is easy: the game is symmetric, and the value is
always zero.
10According to the Wikipedia, “General Colonel” is a extant rank in certain armies.
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In proof, we know from [23] that it suffices for such reductions between succinct problems to work that
the corresponding reduction between the non-succinct problems is of a special kind called projection, and
the vast majority of known reductions can be easily rendered as projections. Again for technical reasons,
we modify slightly the construction by adding redundant constraints to the 0, 1,¬ gates to make sure that
N = 2n andM = 3 · 2n − 3
Finally, we reduce Succinct Linear Inequalities toGeneralColonelBlotto. For this part we follow
the surprisingly recent reduction [1] from linear programming to zero-sum games (a 60 year old reduction
due to Danzig was known to be incomplete, but it was far too much technical work to fix it...). Adler’s
reduction starts from a system Ax = b, x ≥ 0 and produces a skew-symmetric payoff matrix
P =

0 0 A e −b
0 0 −eTA 1 −eT b
−AT AT e 0 0 1
−eT −1 0 0 1
bT −bT e 0 −1 0
 .
Actually, Adler starts by adding one extra row to A to ensure that Ax = 0 has no nonzero, nonnegative
solutions; however, in our case this is guaranteed by requiring that the original circuit has at least one nonzero
input. He shows that the system Ax = b, x ≥ 0 has a solution iff the last component of the (symmetric)
maxmin strategy of this zero-sum game is nonzero.
What remains is to label the L = M + N + 3 = 4n rows and columns of this matrix by allocations of
troops by the two general colonels, and define the utility u1. The number of battlefields is 4n, and we define
the set of feasible allocations to be of the form C(S) where S is any subset of the first half of the battlefields.
C(S) assigns one troop to each battlefield in S, and each battlefield j such that j − 2n 6∈ S. That is, troop
assignments in the first and the second half of the battlefields complement each other. Finally, we define the
utility function u1: Given two allocations A,B, u1(A,B) is defined as follows:
• If both A and B are infeasible, u1(A,B) = 0;
• if A is feasible and B is infeasible, u1(A,B) = −c, where c is larger than any payoff; this way, player
1 is disincentivized from using A;
• similarly, if B is feasible and A is infeasible, u1(A,B) = c;
• finally, if both A and B are feasible, say A = C(S) and B = C(T ) for subsets S, T of [2n],
u1(A,B) = Pij , the (i, j)-th entry of the payoff matrix P constructed in Adler’s reduction, where
the binary representation of i is the set S followed by the set [2n]− S, and similarly for j and T .
It is clear that infeasible allocations are dominated, and can thus be eliminated from the game. The feasible
strategies are in one-to-one correspondence with the rows and columns of the matrix P , and thus the maxmin
of theGeneral Colonel Blotto game is the same as the maxmin ofP . Therefore, the last component of the
maxmin strategy is nonzero if and only if the original circuit has value one, and the reduction is complete.
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